forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
crypto: dh - Fix double free of ctx->p
When setting the secret with the software Diffie-Hellman implementation,
if allocating 'g' failed (e.g. if it was longer than
MAX_EXTERN_MPI_BITS), then 'p' was freed twice: once immediately, and
once later when the crypto_kpp tfm was destroyed.
Fix it by using dh_free_ctx() (renamed to dh_clear_ctx()) in the error
paths, as that correctly sets the pointers to NULL.
KASAN report:
MPI: mpi too large (32760 bits)
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mpi_free+0x131/0x170
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88006c7cdf90 by task reproduce_doubl/367
CPU: 1 PID: 367 Comm: reproduce_doubl Not tainted 4.14.0-rc7-00040-g05298abde6fe #7
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xb3/0x10b
? mpi_free+0x131/0x170
print_address_description+0x79/0x2a0
? mpi_free+0x131/0x170
kasan_report+0x236/0x340
? akcipher_register_instance+0x90/0x90
__asan_report_load4_noabort+0x14/0x20
mpi_free+0x131/0x170
? akcipher_register_instance+0x90/0x90
dh_exit_tfm+0x3d/0x140
crypto_kpp_exit_tfm+0x52/0x70
crypto_destroy_tfm+0xb3/0x250
__keyctl_dh_compute+0x640/0xe90
? kasan_slab_free+0x12f/0x180
? dh_data_from_key+0x240/0x240
? key_create_or_update+0x1ee/0xb20
? key_instantiate_and_link+0x440/0x440
? lock_contended+0xee0/0xee0
? kfree+0xcf/0x210
? SyS_add_key+0x268/0x340
keyctl_dh_compute+0xb3/0xf1
? __keyctl_dh_compute+0xe90/0xe90
? SyS_add_key+0x26d/0x340
? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0xbe
? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x3f4/0x560
SyS_keyctl+0x72/0x2c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x43ccf9
RSP: 002b:00007ffeeec96158 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000fa
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000248b9b9 RCX: 000000000043ccf9
RDX: 00007ffeeec96170 RSI: 00007ffeeec96160 RDI: 0000000000000017
RBP: 0000000000000046 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0248b9b9143dc936
R10: 0000000000001000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000409670 R14: 0000000000409700 R15: 0000000000000000
Allocated by task 367:
save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
kasan_kmalloc+0xeb/0x180
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x114/0x300
mpi_alloc+0x4b/0x230
mpi_read_raw_data+0xbe/0x360
dh_set_secret+0x1dc/0x460
__keyctl_dh_compute+0x623/0xe90
keyctl_dh_compute+0xb3/0xf1
SyS_keyctl+0x72/0x2c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
Freed by task 367:
save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
kasan_slab_free+0xab/0x180
kfree+0xb5/0x210
mpi_free+0xcb/0x170
dh_set_secret+0x2d7/0x460
__keyctl_dh_compute+0x623/0xe90
keyctl_dh_compute+0xb3/0xf1
SyS_keyctl+0x72/0x2c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
Fixes: 802c7f1c84
("crypto: dh - Add DH software implementation")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.8+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This commit is contained in:
parent
c3577f6100
commit
12d41a023e
33
crypto/dh.c
33
crypto/dh.c
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@ -21,19 +21,12 @@ struct dh_ctx {
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MPI xa;
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};
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static inline void dh_clear_params(struct dh_ctx *ctx)
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static void dh_clear_ctx(struct dh_ctx *ctx)
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{
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mpi_free(ctx->p);
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mpi_free(ctx->g);
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ctx->p = NULL;
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ctx->g = NULL;
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}
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static void dh_free_ctx(struct dh_ctx *ctx)
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{
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dh_clear_params(ctx);
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mpi_free(ctx->xa);
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ctx->xa = NULL;
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memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
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}
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/*
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@ -71,10 +64,8 @@ static int dh_set_params(struct dh_ctx *ctx, struct dh *params)
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return -EINVAL;
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ctx->g = mpi_read_raw_data(params->g, params->g_size);
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if (!ctx->g) {
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mpi_free(ctx->p);
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if (!ctx->g)
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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@ -86,21 +77,23 @@ static int dh_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buf,
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struct dh params;
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/* Free the old MPI key if any */
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dh_free_ctx(ctx);
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dh_clear_ctx(ctx);
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if (crypto_dh_decode_key(buf, len, ¶ms) < 0)
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return -EINVAL;
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goto err_clear_ctx;
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if (dh_set_params(ctx, ¶ms) < 0)
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return -EINVAL;
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goto err_clear_ctx;
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ctx->xa = mpi_read_raw_data(params.key, params.key_size);
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if (!ctx->xa) {
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dh_clear_params(ctx);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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if (!ctx->xa)
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goto err_clear_ctx;
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return 0;
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err_clear_ctx:
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dh_clear_ctx(ctx);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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static int dh_compute_value(struct kpp_request *req)
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@ -158,7 +151,7 @@ static void dh_exit_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
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{
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struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm);
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dh_free_ctx(ctx);
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dh_clear_ctx(ctx);
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}
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static struct kpp_alg dh = {
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