forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
LSM: SafeSetID: refactor policy hash table
parent_kuid and child_kuid are kuids, there is no reason to make them uint64_t. (And anyway, in the kernel, the normal name for that would be u64, not uint64_t.) check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key() and check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key_value() are basically the same thing, merge them. Also fix the comment that claimed that (1<<8)==128. Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
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@ -14,67 +14,40 @@
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#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SafeSetID: " fmt
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#include <linux/hashtable.h>
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#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/ptrace.h>
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#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include "lsm.h"
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/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
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int safesetid_initialized;
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#define NUM_BITS 8 /* 128 buckets in hash table */
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#define NUM_BITS 8 /* 256 buckets in hash table */
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static DEFINE_HASHTABLE(safesetid_whitelist_hashtable, NUM_BITS);
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/*
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* Hash table entry to store safesetid policy signifying that 'parent' user
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* can setid to 'child' user.
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*/
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struct entry {
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struct hlist_node next;
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struct hlist_node dlist; /* for deletion cleanup */
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uint64_t parent_kuid;
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uint64_t child_kuid;
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};
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static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(safesetid_whitelist_hashtable_spinlock);
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static bool check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key(kuid_t parent)
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static enum sid_policy_type setuid_policy_lookup(kuid_t src, kuid_t dst)
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{
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struct entry *entry;
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enum sid_policy_type result = SIDPOL_DEFAULT;
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rcu_read_lock();
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hash_for_each_possible_rcu(safesetid_whitelist_hashtable,
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entry, next, __kuid_val(parent)) {
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if (entry->parent_kuid == __kuid_val(parent)) {
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entry, next, __kuid_val(src)) {
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if (!uid_eq(entry->src_uid, src))
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continue;
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if (uid_eq(entry->dst_uid, dst)) {
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rcu_read_unlock();
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return true;
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return SIDPOL_ALLOWED;
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}
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result = SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
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}
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rcu_read_unlock();
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return false;
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}
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static bool check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key_value(kuid_t parent,
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kuid_t child)
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{
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struct entry *entry;
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rcu_read_lock();
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hash_for_each_possible_rcu(safesetid_whitelist_hashtable,
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entry, next, __kuid_val(parent)) {
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if (entry->parent_kuid == __kuid_val(parent) &&
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entry->child_kuid == __kuid_val(child)) {
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rcu_read_unlock();
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return true;
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}
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}
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rcu_read_unlock();
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return false;
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return result;
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}
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static int safesetid_security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
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@ -83,7 +56,7 @@ static int safesetid_security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
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unsigned int opts)
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{
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if (cap == CAP_SETUID &&
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check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key(cred->uid)) {
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setuid_policy_lookup(cred->uid, INVALID_UID) != SIDPOL_DEFAULT) {
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if (!(opts & CAP_OPT_INSETID)) {
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/*
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* Deny if we're not in a set*uid() syscall to avoid
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@ -116,7 +89,8 @@ static bool uid_permitted_for_cred(const struct cred *old, kuid_t new_uid)
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* Transitions to new UIDs require a check against the policy of the old
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* RUID.
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*/
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permitted = check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key_value(old->uid, new_uid);
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permitted =
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setuid_policy_lookup(old->uid, new_uid) != SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
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if (!permitted) {
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pr_warn("UID transition ((%d,%d,%d) -> %d) blocked\n",
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__kuid_val(old->uid), __kuid_val(old->euid),
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@ -136,7 +110,7 @@ static int safesetid_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new,
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{
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/* Do nothing if there are no setuid restrictions for our old RUID. */
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if (!check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key(old->uid))
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if (setuid_policy_lookup(old->uid, INVALID_UID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
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return 0;
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if (uid_permitted_for_cred(old, new->uid) &&
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@ -159,14 +133,14 @@ int add_safesetid_whitelist_entry(kuid_t parent, kuid_t child)
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struct entry *new;
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/* Return if entry already exists */
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if (check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key_value(parent, child))
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if (setuid_policy_lookup(parent, child) == SIDPOL_ALLOWED)
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return 0;
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new = kzalloc(sizeof(struct entry), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!new)
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return -ENOMEM;
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new->parent_kuid = __kuid_val(parent);
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new->child_kuid = __kuid_val(child);
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new->src_uid = parent;
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new->dst_uid = child;
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spin_lock(&safesetid_whitelist_hashtable_spinlock);
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hash_add_rcu(safesetid_whitelist_hashtable,
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&new->next,
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@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
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#define _SAFESETID_H
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#include <linux/types.h>
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#include <linux/uidgid.h>
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#include <linux/hashtable.h>
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/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
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extern int safesetid_initialized;
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@ -25,6 +27,23 @@ enum safesetid_whitelist_file_write_type {
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SAFESETID_WHITELIST_FLUSH, /* Flush whitelist policies. */
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};
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enum sid_policy_type {
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SIDPOL_DEFAULT, /* source ID is unaffected by policy */
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SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED, /* source ID is affected by policy */
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SIDPOL_ALLOWED /* target ID explicitly allowed */
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};
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/*
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* Hash table entry to store safesetid policy signifying that 'src_uid'
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* can setid to 'dst_uid'.
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*/
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struct entry {
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struct hlist_node next;
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struct hlist_node dlist; /* for deletion cleanup */
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kuid_t src_uid;
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kuid_t dst_uid;
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};
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/* Add entry to safesetid whitelist to allow 'parent' to setid to 'child'. */
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int add_safesetid_whitelist_entry(kuid_t parent, kuid_t child);
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