forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
fs: Don't dump core if the corefile would become world-readable.
On a filesystem like vfat, all files are created with the same owner and mode independent of who created the file. When a vfat filesystem is mounted with root as owner of all files and read access for everyone, root's processes left world-readable coredumps on it (but other users' processes only left empty corefiles when given write access because of the uid mismatch). Given that the old behavior was inconsistent and insecure, I don't see a problem with changing it. Now, all processes refuse to dump core unless the resulting corefile will only be readable by their owner. Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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@ -685,11 +685,15 @@ void do_coredump(const siginfo_t *siginfo)
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if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
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goto close_fail;
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/*
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* Dont allow local users get cute and trick others to coredump
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* into their pre-created files.
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* Don't dump core if the filesystem changed owner or mode
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* of the file during file creation. This is an issue when
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* a process dumps core while its cwd is e.g. on a vfat
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* filesystem.
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*/
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if (!uid_eq(inode->i_uid, current_fsuid()))
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goto close_fail;
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if ((inode->i_mode & 0677) != 0600)
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goto close_fail;
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if (!(cprm.file->f_mode & FMODE_CAN_WRITE))
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goto close_fail;
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if (do_truncate(cprm.file->f_path.dentry, 0, 0, cprm.file))
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