forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
Btrfs: fix an integer overflow check
This isn't super serious because you need CAP_ADMIN to run this code.
I added this integer overflow check last year but apparently I am
rubbish at writing integer overflow checks... There are two issues.
First, access_ok() works on unsigned long type and not u64 so on 32 bit
systems the access_ok() could be checking a truncated size. The other
issue is that we should be using a stricter limit so we don't overflow
the kzalloc() setting ctx->clone_roots later in the function after the
access_ok():
alloc_size = sizeof(struct clone_root) * (arg->clone_sources_count + 1);
sctx->clone_roots = kzalloc(alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
Fixes: f5ecec3ce2
("btrfs: send: silence an integer overflow warning")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ added comment ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
ce0dcee626
commit
457ae7268b
@ -6305,8 +6305,13 @@ long btrfs_ioctl_send(struct file *mnt_file, void __user *arg_)
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goto out;
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}
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/*
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* Check that we don't overflow at later allocations, we request
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* clone_sources_count + 1 items, and compare to unsigned long inside
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* access_ok.
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*/
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if (arg->clone_sources_count >
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ULLONG_MAX / sizeof(*arg->clone_sources)) {
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ULONG_MAX / sizeof(struct clone_root) - 1) {
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ret = -EINVAL;
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goto out;
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}
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