forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
x86/mm/32: Bring back vmalloc faulting on x86_32
One can not simply remove vmalloc faulting on x86-32. Upstream commit:7f0a002b5a
("x86/mm: remove vmalloc faulting") removed it on x86 alltogether because previously the arch_sync_kernel_mappings() interface was introduced. This interface added synchronization of vmalloc/ioremap page-table updates to all page-tables in the system at creation time and was thought to make vmalloc faulting obsolete. But that assumption was incredibly naive. It turned out that there is a race window between the time the vmalloc or ioremap code establishes a mapping and the time it synchronizes this change to other page-tables in the system. During this race window another CPU or thread can establish a vmalloc mapping which uses the same intermediate page-table entries (e.g. PMD or PUD) and does no synchronization in the end, because it found all necessary mappings already present in the kernel reference page-table. But when these intermediate page-table entries are not yet synchronized, the other CPU or thread will continue with a vmalloc address that is not yet mapped in the page-table it currently uses, causing an unhandled page fault and oops like below: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fe80c000 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page *pde = 33183067 *pte = a8648163 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP CPU: 1 PID: 13514 Comm: cve-2017-17053 Tainted: G ... Call Trace: ldt_dup_context+0x66/0x80 dup_mm+0x2b3/0x480 copy_process+0x133b/0x15c0 _do_fork+0x94/0x3e0 __ia32_sys_clone+0x67/0x80 __do_fast_syscall_32+0x3f/0x70 do_fast_syscall_32+0x29/0x60 do_SYSENTER_32+0x15/0x20 entry_SYSENTER_32+0x9f/0xf2 EIP: 0xb7eef549 So the arch_sync_kernel_mappings() interface is racy, but removing it would mean to re-introduce the vmalloc_sync_all() interface, which is even more awful. Keep arch_sync_kernel_mappings() in place and catch the race condition in the page-fault handler instead. Do a partial revert of above commit to get vmalloc faulting on x86-32 back in place. Fixes:7f0a002b5a
("x86/mm: remove vmalloc faulting") Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200902155904.17544-1-joro@8bytes.org
This commit is contained in:
parent
aef0148f36
commit
4819e15f74
|
@ -190,6 +190,53 @@ static inline pmd_t *vmalloc_sync_one(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long address)
|
|||
return pmd_k;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Handle a fault on the vmalloc or module mapping area
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This is needed because there is a race condition between the time
|
||||
* when the vmalloc mapping code updates the PMD to the point in time
|
||||
* where it synchronizes this update with the other page-tables in the
|
||||
* system.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* In this race window another thread/CPU can map an area on the same
|
||||
* PMD, finds it already present and does not synchronize it with the
|
||||
* rest of the system yet. As a result v[mz]alloc might return areas
|
||||
* which are not mapped in every page-table in the system, causing an
|
||||
* unhandled page-fault when they are accessed.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static noinline int vmalloc_fault(unsigned long address)
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned long pgd_paddr;
|
||||
pmd_t *pmd_k;
|
||||
pte_t *pte_k;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Make sure we are in vmalloc area: */
|
||||
if (!(address >= VMALLOC_START && address < VMALLOC_END))
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Synchronize this task's top level page-table
|
||||
* with the 'reference' page table.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Do _not_ use "current" here. We might be inside
|
||||
* an interrupt in the middle of a task switch..
|
||||
*/
|
||||
pgd_paddr = read_cr3_pa();
|
||||
pmd_k = vmalloc_sync_one(__va(pgd_paddr), address);
|
||||
if (!pmd_k)
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
|
||||
if (pmd_large(*pmd_k))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
pte_k = pte_offset_kernel(pmd_k, address);
|
||||
if (!pte_present(*pte_k))
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(vmalloc_fault);
|
||||
|
||||
void arch_sync_kernel_mappings(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned long addr;
|
||||
|
@ -1110,6 +1157,37 @@ do_kern_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long hw_error_code,
|
|||
*/
|
||||
WARN_ON_ONCE(hw_error_code & X86_PF_PK);
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* We can fault-in kernel-space virtual memory on-demand. The
|
||||
* 'reference' page table is init_mm.pgd.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* NOTE! We MUST NOT take any locks for this case. We may
|
||||
* be in an interrupt or a critical region, and should
|
||||
* only copy the information from the master page table,
|
||||
* nothing more.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Before doing this on-demand faulting, ensure that the
|
||||
* fault is not any of the following:
|
||||
* 1. A fault on a PTE with a reserved bit set.
|
||||
* 2. A fault caused by a user-mode access. (Do not demand-
|
||||
* fault kernel memory due to user-mode accesses).
|
||||
* 3. A fault caused by a page-level protection violation.
|
||||
* (A demand fault would be on a non-present page which
|
||||
* would have X86_PF_PROT==0).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This is only needed to close a race condition on x86-32 in
|
||||
* the vmalloc mapping/unmapping code. See the comment above
|
||||
* vmalloc_fault() for details. On x86-64 the race does not
|
||||
* exist as the vmalloc mappings don't need to be synchronized
|
||||
* there.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (!(hw_error_code & (X86_PF_RSVD | X86_PF_USER | X86_PF_PROT))) {
|
||||
if (vmalloc_fault(address) >= 0)
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
/* Was the fault spurious, caused by lazy TLB invalidation? */
|
||||
if (spurious_kernel_fault(hw_error_code, address))
|
||||
return;
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user