forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
netfilter: Validate the sequence number of dataless ACK packets as well
We spare nothing by not validating the sequence number of dataless ACK packets and enabling it makes harder off-path attacks. See: "Reflection scan: an Off-Path Attack on TCP" by Jan Wrobel, http://arxiv.org/abs/1201.2074 Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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@ -630,15 +630,9 @@ static bool tcp_in_window(const struct nf_conn *ct,
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ack = sack = receiver->td_end;
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}
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if (seq == end
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&& (!tcph->rst
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|| (seq == 0 && state->state == TCP_CONNTRACK_SYN_SENT)))
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if (tcph->rst && seq == 0 && state->state == TCP_CONNTRACK_SYN_SENT)
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/*
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* Packets contains no data: we assume it is valid
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* and check the ack value only.
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* However RST segments are always validated by their
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* SEQ number, except when seq == 0 (reset sent answering
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* SYN.
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* RST sent answering SYN.
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*/
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seq = end = sender->td_end;
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