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IMA: pre-allocate buffer to hold keyrings string

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ima_match_keyring() is called while holding rcu read lock. Since this
function executes in atomic context, it should not call any function
that can sleep (such as kstrdup()).

This patch pre-allocates a buffer to hold the keyrings string read from
the IMA policy and uses that to match the given keyring.

Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Fixes: e9085e0ad3 ("IMA: Add support to limit measuring keys")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2020-01-16 18:18:21 -08:00 committed by Mimi Zohar
parent 483ec26eed
commit 5c7bac9fb2
1 changed files with 30 additions and 8 deletions
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38
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
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@ -208,6 +208,10 @@ static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules);
static LIST_HEAD(ima_temp_rules);
static struct list_head *ima_rules;
/* Pre-allocated buffer used for matching keyrings. */
static char *ima_keyrings;
static size_t ima_keyrings_len;
static int ima_policy __initdata;
static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str)
@ -368,7 +372,7 @@ int ima_lsm_policy_change(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event,
static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
const char *keyring, const struct cred *cred)
{
char *keyrings, *next_keyring, *keyrings_ptr;
char *next_keyring, *keyrings_ptr;
bool matched = false;
if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !rule->uid_op(cred->uid, rule->uid))
@ -380,15 +384,13 @@ static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
if (!keyring)
return false;
keyrings = kstrdup(rule->keyrings, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!keyrings)
return false;
strcpy(ima_keyrings, rule->keyrings);
/*
* "keyrings=" is specified in the policy in the format below:
* keyrings=.builtin_trusted_keys|.ima|.evm
*/
keyrings_ptr = keyrings;
keyrings_ptr = ima_keyrings;
while ((next_keyring = strsep(&keyrings_ptr, "|")) != NULL) {
if (!strcmp(next_keyring, keyring)) {
matched = true;
@ -396,8 +398,6 @@ static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
}
}
kfree(keyrings);
return matched;
}
@ -954,6 +954,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
bool uid_token;
struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
int result = 0;
size_t keyrings_len;
ab = integrity_audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE);
@ -1119,14 +1120,35 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
case Opt_keyrings:
ima_log_string(ab, "keyrings", args[0].from);
keyrings_len = strlen(args[0].from) + 1;
if ((entry->keyrings) ||
(entry->action != MEASURE) ||
(entry->func != KEY_CHECK)) {
(entry->func != KEY_CHECK) ||
(keyrings_len < 2)) {
result = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (keyrings_len > ima_keyrings_len) {
char *tmpbuf;
tmpbuf = krealloc(ima_keyrings, keyrings_len,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tmpbuf) {
result = -ENOMEM;
break;
}
ima_keyrings = tmpbuf;
ima_keyrings_len = keyrings_len;
}
entry->keyrings = kstrdup(args[0].from, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!entry->keyrings) {
kfree(ima_keyrings);
ima_keyrings = NULL;
ima_keyrings_len = 0;
result = -ENOMEM;
break;
}