forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
nfc: Fix the sockaddr length sanitization in llcp_sock_connect
Fix the sockaddr length verification in the connect() handler of NFC/LLCP sockets, to compare against the size of the actual structure expected on input (sockaddr_nfc_llcp) instead of its shorter version (sockaddr_nfc). Both structures are defined in include/uapi/linux/nfc.h. The fields specific to the _llcp extended struct are as follows: 276 __u8 dsap; /* Destination SAP, if known */ 277 __u8 ssap; /* Source SAP to be bound to */ 278 char service_name[NFC_LLCP_MAX_SERVICE_NAME]; /* Service name URI */; 279 size_t service_name_len; If the caller doesn't provide a sufficiently long sockaddr buffer, these fields remain uninitialized (and they currently originate from the stack frame of the top-level sys_connect handler). They are then copied by llcp_sock_connect() into internal storage (nfc_llcp_sock structure), and could be subsequently read back through the user-mode getsockname() function (handled by llcp_sock_getname()). This would result in the disclosure of up to ~70 uninitialized bytes from the kernel stack to user-mode clients capable of creating AFC_NFC sockets. Signed-off-by: Mateusz Jurczyk <mjurczyk@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
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@ -662,8 +662,7 @@ static int llcp_sock_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *_addr,
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pr_debug("sock %p sk %p flags 0x%x\n", sock, sk, flags);
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if (!addr || len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_nfc) ||
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addr->sa_family != AF_NFC)
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if (!addr || len < sizeof(*addr) || addr->sa_family != AF_NFC)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (addr->service_name_len == 0 && addr->dsap == 0)
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