forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
f2fs: fix to avoid memory leakage in f2fs_listxattr
In f2fs_listxattr, there is no boundary check before memcpy e_name to buffer. If the e_name_len is corrupted, unexpected memory contents may be returned to the buffer. Signed-off-by: Randall Huang <huangrandall@google.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
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9f701f6c77
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688078e7f3
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@ -539,8 +539,9 @@ int f2fs_getxattr(struct inode *inode, int index, const char *name,
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ssize_t f2fs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
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{
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struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
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nid_t xnid = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid;
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struct f2fs_xattr_entry *entry;
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void *base_addr;
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void *base_addr, *last_base_addr;
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int error = 0;
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size_t rest = buffer_size;
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@ -550,6 +551,8 @@ ssize_t f2fs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
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if (error)
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return error;
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last_base_addr = (void *)base_addr + XATTR_SIZE(xnid, inode);
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list_for_each_xattr(entry, base_addr) {
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const struct xattr_handler *handler =
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f2fs_xattr_handler(entry->e_name_index);
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@ -557,6 +560,15 @@ ssize_t f2fs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
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size_t prefix_len;
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size_t size;
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if ((void *)(entry) + sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr ||
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(void *)XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(entry) > last_base_addr) {
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f2fs_err(F2FS_I_SB(inode), "inode (%lu) has corrupted xattr",
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inode->i_ino);
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set_sbi_flag(F2FS_I_SB(inode), SBI_NEED_FSCK);
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error = -EFSCORRUPTED;
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goto cleanup;
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}
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if (!handler || (handler->list && !handler->list(dentry)))
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continue;
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