forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
wext: verify buffer size for SIOCSIWENCODEEXT
Another design flaw in wireless extensions (is anybody surprised?) in the way it handles the iw_encode_ext structure: The structure is part of the 'extra' memory but contains the key length explicitly, instead of it just being the length of the extra buffer - size of the struct and using the explicit key length only for the get operation (which only writes it). Therefore, we have this layout: extra: +-------------------------+ | struct iw_encode_ext { | | ... | | u16 key_len; | | u8 key[0]; | | }; | +-------------------------+ | key material | +-------------------------+ Now, all drivers I checked use ext->key_len without checking that both key_len and the struct fit into the extra buffer that has been copied from userspace. This leads to a buffer overrun while reading that buffer, depending on the driver it may be possible to specify arbitrary key_len or it may need to be a proper length for the key algorithm specified. Thankfully, this is only exploitable by root, but root can actually cause a segfault or use kernel memory as a key (which you can even get back with siocgiwencode or siocgiwencodeext from the key buffer). Fix this by verifying that key_len fits into the buffer along with struct iw_encode_ext. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
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@ -786,6 +786,13 @@ static int ioctl_standard_iw_point(struct iw_point *iwp, unsigned int cmd,
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err = -EFAULT;
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goto out;
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}
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if (cmd == SIOCSIWENCODEEXT) {
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struct iw_encode_ext *ee = (void *) extra;
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if (iwp->length < sizeof(*ee) + ee->key_len)
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return -EFAULT;
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}
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}
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err = handler(dev, info, (union iwreq_data *) iwp, extra);
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