forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
net: atm: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities
arg is controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: net/atm/lec.c:715 lec_mcast_attach() warn: potential spectre issue 'dev_lec' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing arg before using it to index dev_lec. Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/ Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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@ -710,7 +710,10 @@ static int lec_vcc_attach(struct atm_vcc *vcc, void __user *arg)
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static int lec_mcast_attach(struct atm_vcc *vcc, int arg)
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{
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if (arg < 0 || arg >= MAX_LEC_ITF || !dev_lec[arg])
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if (arg < 0 || arg >= MAX_LEC_ITF)
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return -EINVAL;
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arg = array_index_nospec(arg, MAX_LEC_ITF);
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if (!dev_lec[arg])
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return -EINVAL;
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vcc->proto_data = dev_lec[arg];
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return lec_mcast_make(netdev_priv(dev_lec[arg]), vcc);
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@ -728,6 +731,7 @@ static int lecd_attach(struct atm_vcc *vcc, int arg)
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i = arg;
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if (arg >= MAX_LEC_ITF)
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return -EINVAL;
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i = array_index_nospec(arg, MAX_LEC_ITF);
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if (!dev_lec[i]) {
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int size;
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