forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
xen: hack to prevent bad segment register reload
The hypervisor saves and restores the segment registers as part of the state is saves while context switching. If, during a context switch, the next process doesn't use the TLS segments, it invalidates the GDT entry, causing the segment register reload to fault. This fault effectively doubles the cost of a context switch. This patch is a band-aid workaround which clears the usermode %gs after it has been saved for the previous process, but before it gets reloaded for the next, and it avoids having the hypervisor attempt to erroneously reload it. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
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@ -291,6 +291,18 @@ static void xen_load_tls(struct thread_struct *t, unsigned int cpu)
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load_TLS_descriptor(t, cpu, 2);
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xen_mc_issue(PARAVIRT_LAZY_CPU);
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/*
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* XXX sleazy hack: If we're being called in a lazy-cpu zone,
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* it means we're in a context switch, and %gs has just been
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* saved. This means we can zero it out to prevent faults on
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* exit from the hypervisor if the next process has no %gs.
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* Either way, it has been saved, and the new value will get
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* loaded properly. This will go away as soon as Xen has been
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* modified to not save/restore %gs for normal hypercalls.
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*/
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if (xen_get_lazy_mode() == PARAVIRT_LAZY_CPU)
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loadsegment(gs, 0);
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}
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static void xen_write_ldt_entry(struct desc_struct *dt, int entrynum,
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