forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
module: replace the existing LSM hook in init_module
Both the init_module and finit_module syscalls call either directly or indirectly the security_kernel_read_file LSM hook. This patch replaces the direct call in init_module with a call to the new security_kernel_load_data hook and makes the corresponding changes in SELinux, LoadPin, and IMA. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
ef96837b0d
commit
c77b8cdf74
|
@ -2876,7 +2876,7 @@ static int copy_module_from_user(const void __user *umod, unsigned long len,
|
|||
if (info->len < sizeof(*(info->hdr)))
|
||||
return -ENOEXEC;
|
||||
|
||||
err = security_kernel_read_file(NULL, READING_MODULE);
|
||||
err = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_MODULE);
|
||||
if (err)
|
||||
return err;
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -429,16 +429,6 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry)
|
|||
*/
|
||||
int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
|
||||
{
|
||||
bool sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced();
|
||||
|
||||
if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) {
|
||||
if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) &&
|
||||
(ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) {
|
||||
pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n");
|
||||
return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 0; /* We rely on module signature checking */
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -479,9 +469,6 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
|
|||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) /* MODULE_SIG_FORCE enabled */
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/* permit signed certs */
|
||||
if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
@ -510,6 +497,8 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
|
|||
*/
|
||||
int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
|
||||
{
|
||||
bool sig_enforce;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) != IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -525,6 +514,14 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
|
|||
pr_err("Prevent firmware sysfs fallback loading.\n");
|
||||
return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
|
||||
}
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case LOADING_MODULE:
|
||||
sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced();
|
||||
|
||||
if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES)) {
|
||||
pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n");
|
||||
return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
|
||||
}
|
||||
default:
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -173,9 +173,15 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
|
|||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
|
||||
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security),
|
||||
LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file),
|
||||
LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, loadpin_load_data),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
void __init loadpin_add_hooks(void)
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -4073,6 +4073,20 @@ static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
|
|||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int rc = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
switch (id) {
|
||||
case LOADING_MODULE:
|
||||
rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL);
|
||||
default:
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
|
||||
|
@ -6972,6 +6986,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
|
|||
LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
|
||||
LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
|
||||
LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
|
||||
LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data),
|
||||
LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file),
|
||||
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
|
||||
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user