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bpf: add per-insn complexity limit

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malicious bpf program may try to force the verifier to remember
a lot of distinct verifier states.
Put a limit to number of per-insn 'struct bpf_verifier_state'.
Note that hitting the limit doesn't reject the program.
It potentially makes the verifier do more steps to analyze the program.
It means that malicious programs will hit BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS sooner
instead of spending cpu time walking long link list.

The limit of BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES==64 affects cilium progs
with slight increase in number of "steps" it takes to successfully verify
the programs:
                       before    after
bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o         1940      1940
bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o         3089      3089
bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o       1065      1065
bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o     28052  |  28162
bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o      35487  |  35541
bpf_netdev.o            10864     10864
bpf_overlay.o           6643      6643
bpf_lcx_jit.o           38437     38437

But it also makes malicious program to be rejected in 0.4 seconds vs 6.5
Hence apply this limit to unprivileged programs only.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
This commit is contained in:
Alexei Starovoitov 2018-12-03 22:46:06 -08:00 committed by Daniel Borkmann
parent 4f7b3e8258
commit ceefbc96fa
1 changed files with 6 additions and 1 deletions
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7
kernel/bpf/verifier.c
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@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem {
#define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS 131072
#define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STACK 1024
#define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES 64
#define BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV 1UL
#define BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON ((void *)((0xeB9FUL << 1) + \
@ -5047,7 +5048,7 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
struct bpf_verifier_state_list *new_sl;
struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl;
struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state, *new;
int i, j, err;
int i, j, err, states_cnt = 0;
sl = env->explored_states[insn_idx];
if (!sl)
@ -5074,8 +5075,12 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
return 1;
}
sl = sl->next;
states_cnt++;
}
if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && states_cnt > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES)
return 0;
/* there were no equivalent states, remember current one.
* technically the current state is not proven to be safe yet,
* but it will either reach outer most bpf_exit (which means it's safe)