forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre-v2
Track whether all the cores in the machine are vulnerable to Spectre-v2, and whether all the vulnerable cores have been mitigated. We then expose this information to userspace via sysfs. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Tested-by: Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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@ -512,6 +512,10 @@ cpu_enable_cache_maint_trap(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
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.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM, \
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CAP_MIDR_RANGE_LIST(midr_list)
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/* Track overall mitigation state. We are only mitigated if all cores are ok */
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static bool __hardenbp_enab = true;
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static bool __spectrev2_safe = true;
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/*
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* List of CPUs that do not need any Spectre-v2 mitigation at all.
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*/
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@ -522,6 +526,10 @@ static const struct midr_range spectre_v2_safe_list[] = {
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{ /* sentinel */ }
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};
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/*
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* Track overall bp hardening for all heterogeneous cores in the machine.
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* We are only considered "safe" if all booted cores are known safe.
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*/
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static bool __maybe_unused
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check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
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{
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@ -543,6 +551,8 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
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if (!need_wa)
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return false;
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__spectrev2_safe = false;
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if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR)) {
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pr_warn_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by kernel configuration\n");
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__hardenbp_enab = false;
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@ -552,11 +562,14 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
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/* forced off */
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if (__nospectre_v2) {
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pr_info_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
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__hardenbp_enab = false;
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return false;
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}
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if (need_wa < 0)
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if (need_wa < 0) {
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pr_warn_once("ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 missing from firmware\n");
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__hardenbp_enab = false;
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}
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return (need_wa > 0);
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}
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@ -779,3 +792,15 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
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{
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return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
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}
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ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
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char *buf)
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{
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if (__spectrev2_safe)
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return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
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if (__hardenbp_enab)
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return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: Branch predictor hardening\n");
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return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
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}
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