forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
proc: only require mm_struct for writing
commit 94f0b2d4a1d0c52035aef425da5e022bd2cb1c71 upstream. Commit 591a22c14d3f ("proc: Track /proc/$pid/attr/ opener mm_struct") we started using __mem_open() to track the mm_struct at open-time, so that we could then check it for writes. But that also ended up making the permission checks at open time much stricter - and not just for writes, but for reads too. And that in turn caused a regression for at least Fedora 29, where NIC interfaces fail to start when using NetworkManager. Since only the write side wanted the mm_struct test, ignore any failures by __mem_open() at open time, leaving reads unaffected. The write() time verification of the mm_struct pointer will then catch the failure case because a NULL pointer will not match a valid 'current->mm'. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/YMjTlp2FSJYvoyFa@unreal/ Fixes: 591a22c14d3f ("proc: Track /proc/$pid/attr/ opener mm_struct") Reported-and-tested-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Cc: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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@ -2677,7 +2677,9 @@ static int proc_pident_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx,
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#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
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static int proc_pid_attr_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
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{
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return __mem_open(inode, file, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);
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file->private_data = NULL;
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__mem_open(inode, file, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);
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return 0;
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}
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static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf,
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