forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
fs-verity: use smp_load_acquire() for ->i_verity_info
Normally smp_store_release() or cmpxchg_release() is paired with
smp_load_acquire(). Sometimes smp_load_acquire() can be replaced with
the more lightweight READ_ONCE(). However, for this to be safe, all the
published memory must only be accessed in a way that involves the
pointer itself. This may not be the case if allocating the object also
involves initializing a static or global variable, for example.
fsverity_info::tree_params.hash_alg->tfm is a crypto_ahash object that's
internal to and is allocated by the crypto subsystem. So by using
READ_ONCE() for ->i_verity_info, we're relying on internal
implementation details of the crypto subsystem.
Remove this fragile assumption by using smp_load_acquire() instead.
Also fix the cmpxchg logic to correctly execute an ACQUIRE barrier when
losing the cmpxchg race, since cmpxchg doesn't guarantee a memory
barrier on failure.
(Note: I haven't seen any real-world problems here. This change is just
fixing the code to be guaranteed correct and less fragile.)
Fixes: fd2d1acfca
("fs-verity: add the hook for file ->open()")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200721225920.114347-6-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
ba47d845d7
commit
f3db0bed45
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@ -221,11 +221,20 @@ struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info(const struct inode *inode,
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void fsverity_set_info(struct inode *inode, struct fsverity_info *vi)
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{
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/*
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* Multiple processes may race to set ->i_verity_info, so use cmpxchg.
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* This pairs with the READ_ONCE() in fsverity_get_info().
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* Multiple tasks may race to set ->i_verity_info, so use
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* cmpxchg_release(). This pairs with the smp_load_acquire() in
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* fsverity_get_info(). I.e., here we publish ->i_verity_info with a
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* RELEASE barrier so that other tasks can ACQUIRE it.
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*/
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if (cmpxchg(&inode->i_verity_info, NULL, vi) != NULL)
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if (cmpxchg_release(&inode->i_verity_info, NULL, vi) != NULL) {
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/* Lost the race, so free the fsverity_info we allocated. */
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fsverity_free_info(vi);
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/*
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* Afterwards, the caller may access ->i_verity_info directly,
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* so make sure to ACQUIRE the winning fsverity_info.
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*/
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(void)fsverity_get_info(inode);
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}
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}
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void fsverity_free_info(struct fsverity_info *vi)
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@ -115,8 +115,13 @@ struct fsverity_operations {
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static inline struct fsverity_info *fsverity_get_info(const struct inode *inode)
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{
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/* pairs with the cmpxchg() in fsverity_set_info() */
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return READ_ONCE(inode->i_verity_info);
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/*
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* Pairs with the cmpxchg_release() in fsverity_set_info().
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* I.e., another task may publish ->i_verity_info concurrently,
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* executing a RELEASE barrier. We need to use smp_load_acquire() here
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* to safely ACQUIRE the memory the other task published.
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*/
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return smp_load_acquire(&inode->i_verity_info);
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}
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/* enable.c */
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