Now that we aren't so rigid about the length of the key being passed
in, we need to be a bit more rigorous about checking the length of
the actual data against the claimed length (a'la num_subauths field).
Check for the case where userspace sends us a seemingly valid key
with a num_subauths field that goes beyond the end of the array. If
that happens, return -EIO and invalidate the key.
Also change the other places where we check for malformed keys in this
code to invalidate the key as well.
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
The cifs.idmap keytype always allocates memory to hold the payload from
userspace. In the common case where we're translating a SID to a UID or
GID, we're allocating memory to hold something that's less than or equal
to the size of a pointer.
When the payload is the same size as a pointer or smaller, just store
it in the payload.value union member instead. That saves us an extra
allocation on the sid_to_id upcall.
Note that we have to take extra care to check the datalen when we
go to dereference the .data pointer in the union, but the callers
now check that as a matter of course anyway.
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
The cifs.idmap handling code currently causes the kernel to cache the
data from userspace twice. It first looks in a rbtree to see if there is
a matching entry for the given id. If there isn't then it calls
request_key which then checks its cache and then calls out to userland
if it doesn't have one. If the userland program establishes a mapping
and downcalls with that info, it then gets cached in the keyring and in
this rbtree.
Aside from the double memory usage and the performance penalty in doing
all of these extra copies, there are some nasty bugs in here too. The
code declares four rbtrees and spinlocks to protect them, but only seems
to use two of them. The upshot is that the same tree is used to hold
(eg) uid:sid and sid:uid mappings. The comparitors aren't equipped to
deal with that.
I think we'd be best off to remove a layer of caching in this code. If
this was originally done for performance reasons, then that really seems
like a premature optimization.
This patch does that -- it removes the rbtrees and the locks that
protect them and simply has the code do a request_key call on each call
into sid_to_id and id_to_sid. This greatly simplifies this code and
should roughly halve the memory utilization from using the idmapping
code.
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
...and make those symbols static in cifsacl.c. Nothing outside
of that file refers to them.
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
The format specifiers are for signed values, but these are unsigned.
Given that '-' is a delimiter between fields, I don't think you'd get
what you'd expect if you got a value here that would overflow the sign
bit.
The version and authority fields are 8 bit values so use a "hh" length
modifier there. The subauths are 32 bit values, so there's no need to
use a "l" length modifier there.
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
According to several places on the Internet and the samba winbind code,
this is hard limited to 15 in windows, not 5. This does balloon out
the allocation of each by 40 bytes, but I don't see any alternative.
Also, rename it to SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES to match the alleged name
of this constant in the windows header files
Finally, rename SIDLEN to SID_STRING_MAX, fix the value to reflect
the change to SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES and document how it was
determined.
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
...and lift the restriction in id_to_sid upcall that the size must be
at least as big as a full cifs_sid.
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
..nothing outside of cifsacl.c calls it. Also fix the incorrect
comment on the function. It returns 0 when they match.
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
...instead of hardcoding in '5' and '6' all over the place.
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Add a label we can goto on error, and get rid of some excess indentation.
Also move to kernel-style comments.
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
The userspace cifs.idmap program generally works with the wbclient libs
to generate binary SIDs in userspace. That program defines the struct
that holds these values as having a max of 15 subauthorities. The kernel
idmapping code however limits that value to 5.
When the kernel copies those values around though, it doesn't sanity
check the num_subauths value handed back from userspace or from the
server. It's possible therefore for userspace to hand us back a bogus
num_subauths value (or one that's valid, but greater than 5) that could
cause the kernel to walk off the end of the cifs_sid->sub_auths array.
Fix this by defining a new routine for copying sids and using that in
all of the places that copy it. If we end up with a sid that's longer
than expected then this approach will just lop off the "extra" subauths,
but that's basically what the code does today already. Better approaches
might be to fix this code to reject SIDs with >5 subauths, or fix it
to handle the subauths array dynamically.
At the same time, change the kernel to check the length of the data
returned by userspace. If it's shorter than struct cifs_sid, reject it
and return -EIO. If that happens we'll end up with fields that are
basically uninitialized.
Long term, it might make sense to redefine cifs_sid using a flexarray at
the end, to allow for variable-length subauth lists, and teach the code
to handle the case where the subauths array being passed in from
userspace is shorter than 5 elements.
Note too, that I don't consider this a security issue since you'd need
a compromised cifs.idmap program. If you have that, you can do all sorts
of nefarious stuff. Still, this is probably reasonable for stable.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Pull module signing support from Rusty Russell:
"module signing is the highlight, but it's an all-over David Howells frenzy..."
Hmm "Magrathea: Glacier signing key". Somebody has been reading too much HHGTTG.
* 'modules-next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux: (37 commits)
X.509: Fix indefinite length element skip error handling
X.509: Convert some printk calls to pr_devel
asymmetric keys: fix printk format warning
MODSIGN: Fix 32-bit overflow in X.509 certificate validity date checking
MODSIGN: Make mrproper should remove generated files.
MODSIGN: Use utf8 strings in signer's name in autogenerated X.509 certs
MODSIGN: Use the same digest for the autogen key sig as for the module sig
MODSIGN: Sign modules during the build process
MODSIGN: Provide a script for generating a key ID from an X.509 cert
MODSIGN: Implement module signature checking
MODSIGN: Provide module signing public keys to the kernel
MODSIGN: Automatically generate module signing keys if missing
MODSIGN: Provide Kconfig options
MODSIGN: Provide gitignore and make clean rules for extra files
MODSIGN: Add FIPS policy
module: signature checking hook
X.509: Add a crypto key parser for binary (DER) X.509 certificates
MPILIB: Provide a function to read raw data into an MPI
X.509: Add an ASN.1 decoder
X.509: Add simple ASN.1 grammar compiler
...
Give the key type the opportunity to preparse the payload prior to the
instantiation and update routines being called. This is done with the
provision of two new key type operations:
int (*preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
void (*free_preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
If the first operation is present, then it is called before key creation (in
the add/update case) or before the key semaphore is taken (in the update and
instantiate cases). The second operation is called to clean up if the first
was called.
preparse() is given the opportunity to fill in the following structure:
struct key_preparsed_payload {
char *description;
void *type_data[2];
void *payload;
const void *data;
size_t datalen;
size_t quotalen;
};
Before the preparser is called, the first three fields will have been cleared,
the payload pointer and size will be stored in data and datalen and the default
quota size from the key_type struct will be stored into quotalen.
The preparser may parse the payload in any way it likes and may store data in
the type_data[] and payload fields for use by the instantiate() and update()
ops.
The preparser may also propose a description for the key by attaching it as a
string to the description field. This can be used by passing a NULL or ""
description to the add_key() system call or the key_create_or_update()
function. This cannot work with request_key() as that required the description
to tell the upcall about the key to be created.
This, for example permits keys that store PGP public keys to generate their own
name from the user ID and public key fingerprint in the key.
The instantiate() and update() operations are then modified to look like this:
int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
int (*update)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
and the new payload data is passed in *prep, whether or not it was preparsed.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This is help us to extend the code for future protocols that can use
another fid mechanism (as SMB2 that has it divided into two parts:
persistent and violatile).
Also rename variables and refactor the code around the changes.
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Those macros add a newline on their own, so there's not any need to
embed one in the message itself.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
The kernel contains some special internal keyrings, for instance the DNS
resolver keyring :
2a93faf1 I----- 1 perm 1f030000 0 0 keyring .dns_resolver: empty
It would occasionally be useful to allow the contents of such keyrings to be
flushed by root (cache invalidation).
Allow a flag to be set on a keyring to mark that someone possessing the
sysadmin capability can clear the keyring, even without normal write access to
the keyring.
Set this flag on the special keyrings created by the DNS resolver, the NFS
identity mapper and the CIFS identity mapper.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
On 32 bit systems num_aces * sizeof(struct cifs_ace *) could overflow
leading to a smaller ppace buffer than we expected.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Now build security descriptor to change either owner or group at the
server. Initially security descriptor was built to change only
(D)ACL, that functionality has been extended.
When either an Owner or a Group of a file object at the server is changed,
rest of security descriptor remains same (DACL etc.).
To set security descriptor, it is necessary to open that file
with permission bits of either WRITE_DAC if DACL is being modified or
WRITE_OWNER (Take Ownership) if Owner or Group is being changed.
It is the server that decides whether a set security descriptor with
either owner or group change succeeds or not.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Add data structures and functions necessary to map a uid and gid to SID.
These functions are very similar to the ones used to map a SID to uid and gid.
This time, instead of storing sid to id mapping sorted on a sid value,
id to sid is stored, sorted on an id.
A cifs upcall sends an id (uid or gid) and expects a SID structure
in return, if mapping was done successfully.
A failed id to sid mapping to EINVAL.
This patchset aims to enable chown and chgrp commands when
cifsacl mount option is specified, especially to Windows SMB servers.
Currently we can't do that. So now along with chmod command,
chown and chgrp work.
Winbind is used to map id to a SID. chown and chgrp use an upcall
to provide an id to winbind and upcall returns with corrosponding
SID if any exists. That SID is used to build security descriptor.
The DACL part of a security descriptor is not changed by either
chown or chgrp functionality.
cifs client maintains a separate caches for uid to SID and
gid to SID mapping. This is similar to the one used earlier
to map SID to id (as part of ID mapping code).
I tested it by mounting shares from a Windows (2003) server by
authenticating as two users, one at a time, as Administrator and
as a ordinary user.
And then attempting to change owner of a file on the share.
Depending on the permissions/privileges at the server for that file,
chown request fails to either open a file (to change the ownership)
or to set security descriptor.
So it all depends on privileges on the file at the server and what
user you are authenticated as at the server, cifs client is just a
conduit.
I compared the security descriptor during chown command to that
what smbcacls sends when it is used with -M OWNNER: option
and they are similar.
This patchset aim to enable chown and chgrp commands when
cifsacl mount option is specified, especially to Windows SMB servers.
Currently we can't do that. So now along with chmod command,
chown and chgrp work.
I tested it by mounting shares from a Windows (2003) server by
authenticating as two users, one at a time, as Administrator and
as a ordinary user.
And then attempting to change owner of a file on the share.
Depending on the permissions/privileges at the server for that file,
chown request fails to either open a file (to change the ownership)
or to set security descriptor.
So it all depends on privileges on the file at the server and what
user you are authenticated as at the server, cifs client is just a
conduit.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Add mount options backupuid and backugid.
It allows an authenticated user to access files with the intent to back them
up including their ACLs, who may not have access permission but has
"Backup files and directories user right" on them (by virtue of being part
of the built-in group Backup Operators.
When mount options backupuid is specified, cifs client restricts the
use of backup intents to the user whose effective user id is specified
along with the mount option.
When mount options backupgid is specified, cifs client restricts the
use of backup intents to the users whose effective user id belongs to the
group id specified along with the mount option.
If an authenticated user is not part of the built-in group Backup Operators
at the server, access to such files is denied, even if allowed by the client.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Set security descriptor using path name instead of a file handle.
We can't be sure that the file handle has adequate permission to
set a security descriptor (to modify DACL).
Function set_cifs_acl_by_fid() has been removed since we can't be
sure how a file was opened for writing, a valid request can fail
if the file was not opened with two above mentioned permissions.
We could have opted to add on WRITE_DAC and WRITE_OWNER permissions
to file opens and then use that file handle but adding addtional
permissions such as WRITE_DAC and WRITE_OWNER could cause an
any open to fail.
And it was incorrect to look for read file handle to set a
security descriptor anyway.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Commit 1495f230fa ("vmscan: change shrinker API by passing
shrink_control struct") changed the API of ->shrink(), but missed ubifs
and cifs instances.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
As Jeff just pointed out, __constant_cpu_to_le32 was required instead of
cpu_to_le32 in previous patch to cifsacl.c 383c55350f
(Fix endian error comparing authusers when cifsacl enabled)
CC: Stable <stable@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
CC: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Fix sparse warning:
CHECK fs/cifs/cifsacl.c
fs/cifs/cifsacl.c:41:36: warning: incorrect type in initializer
(different base types)
fs/cifs/cifsacl.c:41:36: expected restricted __le32
fs/cifs/cifsacl.c:41:36: got int
fs/cifs/cifsacl.c:461:52: warning: restricted __le32 degrades to integer
fs/cifs/cifsacl.c:461:73: warning: restricted __le32 degrades to integer
The second one looks harmless but the first one (sid_authusers)
was added in commit 2fbc2f1729
and only affects 2.6.38/2.6.39
CC: Stable <stable@kernel.org>
Reviewed-and-Tested-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Change idmap key name from cifs.cifs_idmap to cifs.idmap.
Removed unused structure wksidarr and function match_sid().
Handle errors correctly in function init_cifs().
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
fs/cifs/cifsacl.c: In function ‘id_rb_search’:
fs/cifs/cifsacl.c:215:19: warning: variable ‘linkto’ set but not used
[-Wunused-but-set-variable]
fs/cifs/cifsacl.c:214:18: warning: variable ‘parent’ set but not used
[-Wunused-but-set-variable]
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
rb tree search and insertion routines.
A SID which needs to be mapped, is looked up in one of the rb trees
depending on whether SID is either owner or group SID.
If found in the tree, a (mapped) id from that node is assigned to
uid or gid as appropriate. If unmapped, an upcall is attempted to
map the SID to an id. If upcall is successful, node is marked as
mapped. If upcall fails, node stays marked as unmapped and a mapping
is attempted again only after an arbitrary time period has passed.
To map a SID, which can be either a Owner SID or a Group SID, key
description starts with the string "os" or "gs" followed by SID converted
to a string. Without "os" or "gs", cifs.upcall does not know whether
SID needs to be mapped to either an uid or a gid.
Nodes in rb tree have fields to prevent multiple upcalls for
a SID. Searching, adding, and removing nodes is done within global locks.
Whenever a node is either found or inserted in a tree, a reference
is taken on that node.
Shrinker routine prunes a node if it has expired but does not prune
an expired node if its refcount is not zero (i.e. sid/id of that node
is_being/will_be accessed).
Thus a node, if its SID needs to be mapped by making an upcall,
can safely stay and its fields accessed without shrinker pruning it.
A reference (refcount) is put on the node without holding the spinlock
but a reference is get on the node by holding the spinlock.
Every time an existing mapped node is accessed or mapping is attempted,
its timestamp is updated to prevent it from getting erased or a
to prevent multiple unnecessary repeat mapping retries respectively.
For now, cifs.upcall is only used to map a SID to an id (uid or gid) but
it would be used to obtain an SID for an id.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Define (global) data structures to store ids, uids and gids, to which a
SID maps. There are two separate trees, one for SID/uid and another one
for SID/gid.
A new type of key, cifs_idmap_key_type, is used.
Keys are instantiated and searched using credential of the root by
overriding and restoring the credentials of the caller requesting the key.
Id mapping functions are invoked under config option of cifs acl.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Allow setting cifs_acl on the server.
Pass on to the server the ACL blob generated by an application.
cifs is just a pass-through, it does not monitor or inspect the contents
of the blob, server decides whether to enforce/apply the ACL blob composed
by an application.
If setting of ACL is succeessful, mark the inode for revalidation.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Exit from parse_dacl if no memory returned from the call to kmalloc.
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <kernel@fomichev.me>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
If a DACL has entries for ACEs for SID Everyone and Authenticated Users,
factor in mask in respective entries during calculation of permissions
for all three, user, group, and other.
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb463216.aspx
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Some of the code under CONFIG_CIFS_ACL is dependent upon code under
CONFIG_CIFS_EXPERIMENTAL, but the Kconfig options don't reflect that
dependency. Move more of the ACL code out from under
CONFIG_CIFS_EXPERIMENTAL and under CONFIG_CIFS_ACL.
Also move find_readable_file out from other any sort of Kconfig
option and make it a function normally compiled in.
Reported-and-Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Add extended attribute name system.cifs_acl
Get/generate cifs/ntfs acl blob and hand over to the invoker however
it wants to parse/process it under experimental configurable option CIFS_ACL.
Do not get CIFS/NTFS ACL for xattr for attribute system.posix_acl_access
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Change the name of function mode_to_acl to mode_to_cifs_acl.
Handle return code in functions mode_to_cifs_acl and
cifs_acl_to_fattr.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Modify get/set_cifs_acl* calls to reutrn error code and percolate the
error code up to the caller.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
When we implement multiuser mounts, we'll need to filter filehandles
by fsuid. Add a flag for multiuser mounts and code to filter by
fsuid when it's set.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Eventually, we'll need to track the use of tcons on a per-sb basis, so that
we know when it's ok to tear them down. Begin this conversion by adding a
new "tcon_link" struct and accessors that get it. For now, the core data
structures are untouched -- cifs_sb still just points to a single tcon and
the pointers are just cast to deal with the accessor functions. A later
patch will flesh this out.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
When we convert cifs to do multiple sessions per mount, we'll need more
than one tcon per superblock. At that point "cifs_sb->tcon" will make
no sense. Add a new accessor function that gets a tcon given a cifs_sb.
For now, it just returns cifs_sb->tcon. Later it'll do more.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Neaten cERROR and cFYI macros, reduce text space
~2.5K
Convert '__FILE__ ": " fmt' to '"%s: " fmt', __FILE__' to save text space
Surround macros with do {} while
Add parentheses to macros
Make statement expression macro from macro with assign
Remove now unnecessary parentheses from cFYI and cERROR uses
defconfig with CIFS support old
$ size fs/cifs/built-in.o
text data bss dec hex filename
156012 1760 148 157920 268e0 fs/cifs/built-in.o
defconfig with CIFS support old
$ size fs/cifs/built-in.o
text data bss dec hex filename
153508 1760 148 155416 25f18 fs/cifs/built-in.o
allyesconfig old:
$ size fs/cifs/built-in.o
text data bss dec hex filename
309138 3864 74824 387826 5eaf2 fs/cifs/built-in.o
allyesconfig new
$ size fs/cifs/built-in.o
text data bss dec hex filename
305655 3864 74824 384343 5dd57 fs/cifs/built-in.o
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.
percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.
http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.
* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.
* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.
The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.
2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.
3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.
4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.
5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.
6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).
* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig
8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.
Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
Currently, cifs_close() tries to wait until all I/O is complete and then
frees the file private data. If I/O does not completely in a reasonable
amount of time it frees the structure anyway, leaving a potential use-
after-free situation.
This patch changes the wrtPending counter to a complete reference count and
lets the last user free the structure.
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
cifs: convert cifs_get_inode_info and non-posix readdir to use cifs_iget
Rather than allocating an inode and filling it out, have
cifs_get_inode_info fill out a cifs_fattr and call cifs_iget. This means
a pretty hefty reorganization of cifs_get_inode_info.
For the readdir codepath, add a couple of new functions for filling out
cifs_fattr's from different FindFile response infolevels.
Finally, remove cifs_new_inode since there are no more callers.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Thus spake Christoph:
"But this whole set_cifs_acl function is a real mess anyway and needs
some splitting up."
With this change too, it's possible to call acl_to_uid_mode() with a
NULL inode pointer. That (or something close to it) will eventually be
necessary when cifs_get_inode_info is reorganized.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
In mode_to_acl when converting a Unix mode to a Windows ACL
the subauth fields of the SID in the ACL were translated
incorrectly on bigendian architectures
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
