Willem de Bruijn 4f0c40d944 dccp: limit sk_filter trim to payload ... Dccp verifies packet integrity, including length, at initial rcv in dccp_invalid_packet, later pulls headers in dccp_enqueue_skb. A call to sk_filter in-between can cause __skb_pull to wrap skb->len. skb_copy_datagram_msg interprets this as a negative value, so (correctly) fails with EFAULT. The negative length is reported in ioctl SIOCINQ or possibly in a DCCP_WARN in dccp_close. Introduce an sk_receive_skb variant that caps how small a filter program can trim packets, and call this in dccp with the header length. Excessively trimmed packets are now processed normally and queued for reception as 0B payloads. Fixes: 7c657876b6 ("[DCCP]: Initial implementation") Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>		2016-07-13 11:53:41 -07:00
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