kernel_optimize_test/arch/arm/xen
Oleksandr Tyshchenko 43c8d33ce3 xen/arm: Fix race in RB-tree based P2M accounting
commit b75cd218274e01d026dc5240e86fdeb44bbed0c8 upstream.

During the PV driver life cycle the mappings are added to
the RB-tree by set_foreign_p2m_mapping(), which is called from
gnttab_map_refs() and are removed by clear_foreign_p2m_mapping()
which is called from gnttab_unmap_refs(). As both functions end
up calling __set_phys_to_machine_multi() which updates the RB-tree,
this function can be called concurrently.

There is already a "p2m_lock" to protect against concurrent accesses,
but the problem is that the first read of "phys_to_mach.rb_node"
in __set_phys_to_machine_multi() is not covered by it, so this might
lead to the incorrect mappings update (removing in our case) in RB-tree.

In my environment the related issue happens rarely and only when
PV net backend is running, the xen_add_phys_to_mach_entry() claims
that it cannot add new pfn <-> mfn mapping to the tree since it is
already exists which results in a failure when mapping foreign pages.

But there might be other bad consequences related to the non-protected
root reads such use-after-free, etc.

While at it, also fix the similar usage in __pfn_to_mfn(), so
initialize "struct rb_node *n" with the "p2m_lock" held in both
functions to avoid possible bad consequences.

This is CVE-2022-33744 / XSA-406.

Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tyshchenko <oleksandr_tyshchenko@epam.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-07-07 17:52:23 +02:00
..
enlighten.c arm/xen: Don't probe xenbus as part of an early initcall 2021-02-17 11:02:21 +01:00
grant-table.c
hypercall.S
Makefile xen/efi: have a common runtime setup function 2019-10-02 10:31:07 -04:00
mm.c dma-mapping updates for 5.10 2020-10-15 14:43:29 -07:00
p2m.c xen/arm: Fix race in RB-tree based P2M accounting 2022-07-07 17:52:23 +02:00