Javier Martinez Canillas 359efcc2c9 efi/efi_test: Lock down /dev/efi_test and require CAP_SYS_ADMIN ... The driver exposes EFI runtime services to user-space through an IOCTL interface, calling the EFI services function pointers directly without using the efivar API. Disallow access to the /dev/efi_test character device when the kernel is locked down to prevent arbitrary user-space to call EFI runtime services. Also require CAP_SYS_ADMIN to open the chardev to prevent unprivileged users to call the EFI runtime services, instead of just relying on the chardev file mode bits for this. The main user of this driver is the fwts [0] tool that already checks if the effective user ID is 0 and fails otherwise. So this change shouldn't cause any regression to this tool. [0]: https://wiki.ubuntu.com/FirmwareTestSuite/Reference/uefivarinfo Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Acked-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191029173755.27149-7-ardb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>		2019-10-31 09:40:21 +01:00
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libstub	x86, efi: Never relocate kernel below lowest acceptable address	2019-10-31 09:40:19 +01:00
test	efi/efi_test: Lock down /dev/efi_test and require CAP_SYS_ADMIN	2019-10-31 09:40:21 +01:00
apple-properties.c
arm-init.c
arm-runtime.c
capsule-loader.c
capsule.c
cper-arm.c
cper-x86.c
cper.c
dev-path-parser.c
earlycon.c
efi-bgrt.c
efi-pstore.c
efi.c	efi/random: Treat EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL output as bootloader randomness	2019-10-31 09:40:18 +01:00
efibc.c
efivars.c
esrt.c
fake_mem.c
Kconfig
Makefile
memattr.c
memmap.c
rci2-table.c
reboot.c
runtime-map.c
runtime-wrappers.c
tpm.c
vars.c