Gustavo A. R. Silva c709f14f06 ALSA: seq: oss: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability ... dev is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_synth.c:626 snd_seq_oss_synth_make_info() warn: potential spectre issue 'dp->synths' [w] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing dev before using it to index dp->synths. Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>		2019-03-21 13:23:51 +01:00
..
Makefile
seq_oss_device.h	sound: annotate ->poll() instances	2017-11-27 16:20:02 -05:00
seq_oss_event.c	ALSA: seq: oss: Hardening for potential Spectre v1	2018-04-25 10:37:45 +02:00
seq_oss_event.h
seq_oss_init.c
seq_oss_ioctl.c
seq_oss_midi.c	ALSA: seq: Minor cleanup of MIDI event parser helpers	2018-08-01 22:54:35 +02:00
seq_oss_midi.h
seq_oss_readq.c
seq_oss_readq.h
seq_oss_rw.c	vfs: do bulk POLL* -> EPOLL* replacement	2018-02-11 14:34:03 -08:00
seq_oss_synth.c	ALSA: seq: oss: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability	2019-03-21 13:23:51 +01:00
seq_oss_synth.h	ALSA: seq: oss: Hardening for potential Spectre v1	2018-04-25 10:37:45 +02:00
seq_oss_timer.c	ALSA: seq: oss: Use the standard fall-through annotation	2018-10-12 09:31:29 +02:00
seq_oss_timer.h
seq_oss_writeq.c
seq_oss_writeq.h
seq_oss.c	ALSA: seq: Fix poll() error return	2018-07-26 08:23:26 +02:00