forked from luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
2810e5b9a7
This patch tries to coalesce tx requests when constructing grant copy structures. It enables netback to deal with situation when frontend's MAX_SKB_FRAGS is larger than backend's MAX_SKB_FRAGS. With the help of coalescing, this patch tries to address two regressions avoid reopening the security hole in XSA-39. Regression 1. The reduction of the number of supported ring entries (slots) per packet (from 18 to 17). This regression has been around for some time but remains unnoticed until XSA-39 security fix. This is fixed by coalescing slots. Regression 2. The XSA-39 security fix turning "too many frags" errors from just dropping the packet to a fatal error and disabling the VIF. This is fixed by coalescing slots (handling 18 slots when backend's MAX_SKB_FRAGS is 17) which rules out false positive (using 18 slots is legit) and dropping packets using 19 to `max_skb_slots` slots. To avoid reopening security hole in XSA-39, frontend sending packet using more than max_skb_slots is considered malicious. The behavior of netback for packet is thus: 1-18 slots: valid 19-max_skb_slots slots: drop and respond with an error max_skb_slots+ slots: fatal error max_skb_slots is configurable by admin, default value is 20. Also change variable name from "frags" to "slots" in netbk_count_requests. Please note that RX path still has dependency on MAX_SKB_FRAGS. This will be fixed with separate patch. Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
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.. | ||
hvm | ||
io | ||
callback.h | ||
elfnote.h | ||
event_channel.h | ||
features.h | ||
grant_table.h | ||
memory.h | ||
physdev.h | ||
platform.h | ||
sched.h | ||
vcpu.h | ||
version.h | ||
xen-mca.h | ||
xen.h | ||
xencomm.h |