kernel_optimize_test/security/apparmor/ipc.c
John Johansen ef88a7ac55 apparmor: change aad apparmor_audit_data macro to a fn macro
The aad macro can replace aad strings when it is not intended to. Switch
to a fn macro so it is only applied when intended.

Also at the same time cleanup audit_data initialization by putting
common boiler plate behind a macro, and dropping the gfp_t parameter
which will become useless.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 01:18:47 -08:00

108 lines
2.9 KiB
C

/*
* AppArmor security module
*
* This file contains AppArmor ipc mediation
*
* Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
* Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
* published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
* License.
*/
#include <linux/gfp.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include "include/audit.h"
#include "include/capability.h"
#include "include/context.h"
#include "include/policy.h"
#include "include/ipc.h"
/* call back to audit ptrace fields */
static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
{
struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->peer->base.hname);
}
/**
* aa_audit_ptrace - do auditing for ptrace
* @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
* @target: profile being traced (NOT NULL)
* @error: error condition
*
* Returns: %0 or error code
*/
static int aa_audit_ptrace(struct aa_profile *profile,
struct aa_profile *target, int error)
{
DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE);
aad(&sa)->peer = target;
aad(&sa)->error = error;
return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, profile, &sa, audit_cb);
}
/**
* aa_may_ptrace - test if tracer task can trace the tracee
* @tracer: profile of the task doing the tracing (NOT NULL)
* @tracee: task to be traced
* @mode: whether PTRACE_MODE_READ || PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH
*
* Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error
*/
int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_profile *tracer, struct aa_profile *tracee,
unsigned int mode)
{
/* TODO: currently only based on capability, not extended ptrace
* rules,
* Test mode for PTRACE_MODE_READ || PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH
*/
if (unconfined(tracer) || tracer == tracee)
return 0;
/* log this capability request */
return aa_capable(tracer, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, 1);
}
/**
* aa_ptrace - do ptrace permission check and auditing
* @tracer: task doing the tracing (NOT NULL)
* @tracee: task being traced (NOT NULL)
* @mode: ptrace mode either PTRACE_MODE_READ || PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH
*
* Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error
*/
int aa_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer, struct task_struct *tracee,
unsigned int mode)
{
/*
* tracer can ptrace tracee when
* - tracer is unconfined ||
* - tracer is in complain mode
* - tracer has rules allowing it to trace tracee currently this is:
* - confined by the same profile ||
* - tracer profile has CAP_SYS_PTRACE
*/
struct aa_profile *tracer_p = aa_get_task_profile(tracer);
int error = 0;
if (!unconfined(tracer_p)) {
struct aa_profile *tracee_p = aa_get_task_profile(tracee);
error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer_p, tracee_p, mode);
error = aa_audit_ptrace(tracer_p, tracee_p, error);
aa_put_profile(tracee_p);
}
aa_put_profile(tracer_p);
return error;
}