2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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/*
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* fs/nfs4acl/acl.c
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*
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* Common NFSv4 ACL handling code.
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*
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* Copyright (c) 2002, 2003 The Regents of the University of Michigan.
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Marius Aamodt Eriksen <marius@umich.edu>
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* Jeff Sedlak <jsedlak@umich.edu>
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* J. Bruce Fields <bfields@umich.edu>
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its
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* contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
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* from this software without specific prior written permission.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
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* WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
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* DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
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* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
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* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
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* BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
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* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
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* NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
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* SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#include <linux/string.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/list.h>
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#include <linux/types.h>
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/nfs_fs.h>
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#include <linux/posix_acl.h>
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#include <linux/nfs4.h>
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#include <linux/nfs4_acl.h>
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/* mode bit translations: */
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#define NFS4_READ_MODE (NFS4_ACE_READ_DATA)
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#define NFS4_WRITE_MODE (NFS4_ACE_WRITE_DATA | NFS4_ACE_APPEND_DATA)
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#define NFS4_EXECUTE_MODE NFS4_ACE_EXECUTE
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#define NFS4_ANYONE_MODE (NFS4_ACE_READ_ATTRIBUTES | NFS4_ACE_READ_ACL | NFS4_ACE_SYNCHRONIZE)
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#define NFS4_OWNER_MODE (NFS4_ACE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES | NFS4_ACE_WRITE_ACL)
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/* We don't support these bits; insist they be neither allowed nor denied */
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#define NFS4_MASK_UNSUPP (NFS4_ACE_DELETE | NFS4_ACE_WRITE_OWNER \
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| NFS4_ACE_READ_NAMED_ATTRS | NFS4_ACE_WRITE_NAMED_ATTRS)
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/* flags used to simulate posix default ACLs */
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#define NFS4_INHERITANCE_FLAGS (NFS4_ACE_FILE_INHERIT_ACE \
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| NFS4_ACE_DIRECTORY_INHERIT_ACE | NFS4_ACE_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE)
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#define MASK_EQUAL(mask1, mask2) \
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( ((mask1) & NFS4_ACE_MASK_ALL) == ((mask2) & NFS4_ACE_MASK_ALL) )
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static u32
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mask_from_posix(unsigned short perm, unsigned int flags)
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{
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int mask = NFS4_ANYONE_MODE;
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if (flags & NFS4_ACL_OWNER)
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mask |= NFS4_OWNER_MODE;
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if (perm & ACL_READ)
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mask |= NFS4_READ_MODE;
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if (perm & ACL_WRITE)
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mask |= NFS4_WRITE_MODE;
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if ((perm & ACL_WRITE) && (flags & NFS4_ACL_DIR))
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mask |= NFS4_ACE_DELETE_CHILD;
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if (perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
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mask |= NFS4_EXECUTE_MODE;
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return mask;
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}
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static u32
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deny_mask(u32 allow_mask, unsigned int flags)
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{
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u32 ret = ~allow_mask & ~NFS4_MASK_UNSUPP;
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if (!(flags & NFS4_ACL_DIR))
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ret &= ~NFS4_ACE_DELETE_CHILD;
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return ret;
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}
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/* XXX: modify functions to return NFS errors; they're only ever
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* used by nfs code, after all.... */
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[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
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/* We only map from NFSv4 to POSIX ACLs when setting ACLs, when we err on the
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* side of being more restrictive, so the mode bit mapping below is
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* pessimistic. An optimistic version would be needed to handle DENY's,
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* but we espect to coalesce all ALLOWs and DENYs before mapping to mode
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* bits. */
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static void
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low_mode_from_nfs4(u32 perm, unsigned short *mode, unsigned int flags)
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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{
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[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
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u32 write_mode = NFS4_WRITE_MODE;
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
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if (flags & NFS4_ACL_DIR)
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write_mode |= NFS4_ACE_DELETE_CHILD;
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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*mode = 0;
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if ((perm & NFS4_READ_MODE) == NFS4_READ_MODE)
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*mode |= ACL_READ;
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[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
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if ((perm & write_mode) == write_mode)
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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*mode |= ACL_WRITE;
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if ((perm & NFS4_EXECUTE_MODE) == NFS4_EXECUTE_MODE)
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*mode |= ACL_EXECUTE;
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}
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struct ace_container {
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struct nfs4_ace *ace;
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struct list_head ace_l;
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};
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static short ace2type(struct nfs4_ace *);
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static int _posix_to_nfsv4_one(struct posix_acl *, struct nfs4_acl *, unsigned int);
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static struct posix_acl *_nfsv4_to_posix_one(struct nfs4_acl *, unsigned int);
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int nfs4_acl_add_ace(struct nfs4_acl *, u32, u32, u32, int, uid_t);
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2005-06-24 13:04:03 +08:00
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static int nfs4_acl_split(struct nfs4_acl *, struct nfs4_acl *);
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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struct nfs4_acl *
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nfs4_acl_posix_to_nfsv4(struct posix_acl *pacl, struct posix_acl *dpacl,
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unsigned int flags)
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{
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struct nfs4_acl *acl;
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int error = -EINVAL;
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if ((pacl != NULL &&
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(posix_acl_valid(pacl) < 0 || pacl->a_count == 0)) ||
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(dpacl != NULL &&
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(posix_acl_valid(dpacl) < 0 || dpacl->a_count == 0)))
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goto out_err;
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acl = nfs4_acl_new();
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if (acl == NULL) {
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error = -ENOMEM;
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goto out_err;
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}
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if (pacl != NULL) {
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error = _posix_to_nfsv4_one(pacl, acl,
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flags & ~NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT);
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if (error < 0)
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goto out_acl;
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}
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if (dpacl != NULL) {
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error = _posix_to_nfsv4_one(dpacl, acl,
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flags | NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT);
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if (error < 0)
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goto out_acl;
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}
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return acl;
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out_acl:
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nfs4_acl_free(acl);
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out_err:
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acl = ERR_PTR(error);
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return acl;
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}
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static int
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nfs4_acl_add_pair(struct nfs4_acl *acl, int eflag, u32 mask, int whotype,
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uid_t owner, unsigned int flags)
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|
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{
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int error;
|
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|
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error = nfs4_acl_add_ace(acl, NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE,
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eflag, mask, whotype, owner);
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if (error < 0)
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return error;
|
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|
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error = nfs4_acl_add_ace(acl, NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE,
|
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|
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eflag, deny_mask(mask, flags), whotype, owner);
|
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|
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return error;
|
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}
|
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|
|
|
|
|
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/* We assume the acl has been verified with posix_acl_valid. */
|
|
|
|
static int
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|
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_posix_to_nfsv4_one(struct posix_acl *pacl, struct nfs4_acl *acl,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int flags)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct posix_acl_entry *pa, *pe, *group_owner_entry;
|
|
|
|
int error = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
u32 mask, mask_mask;
|
|
|
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int eflag = ((flags & NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT) ?
|
|
|
|
NFS4_INHERITANCE_FLAGS : 0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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BUG_ON(pacl->a_count < 3);
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|
|
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pe = pacl->a_entries + pacl->a_count;
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|
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pa = pe - 2; /* if mask entry exists, it's second from the last. */
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|
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if (pa->e_tag == ACL_MASK)
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|
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mask_mask = deny_mask(mask_from_posix(pa->e_perm, flags), flags);
|
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|
|
else
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|
|
|
mask_mask = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pa = pacl->a_entries;
|
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|
|
BUG_ON(pa->e_tag != ACL_USER_OBJ);
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|
|
|
mask = mask_from_posix(pa->e_perm, flags | NFS4_ACL_OWNER);
|
|
|
|
error = nfs4_acl_add_pair(acl, eflag, mask, NFS4_ACL_WHO_OWNER, 0, flags);
|
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|
|
if (error < 0)
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|
goto out;
|
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|
|
pa++;
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
while (pa->e_tag == ACL_USER) {
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|
mask = mask_from_posix(pa->e_perm, flags);
|
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|
|
error = nfs4_acl_add_ace(acl, NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE,
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|
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eflag, mask_mask, NFS4_ACL_WHO_NAMED, pa->e_id);
|
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|
|
if (error < 0)
|
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|
goto out;
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
|
error = nfs4_acl_add_pair(acl, eflag, mask,
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|
|
NFS4_ACL_WHO_NAMED, pa->e_id, flags);
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|
|
if (error < 0)
|
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goto out;
|
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|
|
pa++;
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|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* In the case of groups, we apply allow ACEs first, then deny ACEs,
|
|
|
|
* since a user can be in more than one group. */
|
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|
|
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/* allow ACEs */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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if (pacl->a_count > 3) {
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BUG_ON(pa->e_tag != ACL_GROUP_OBJ);
|
|
|
|
error = nfs4_acl_add_ace(acl, NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE,
|
|
|
|
NFS4_ACE_IDENTIFIER_GROUP | eflag, mask_mask,
|
|
|
|
NFS4_ACL_WHO_GROUP, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (error < 0)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
group_owner_entry = pa;
|
|
|
|
mask = mask_from_posix(pa->e_perm, flags);
|
|
|
|
error = nfs4_acl_add_ace(acl, NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE,
|
|
|
|
NFS4_ACE_IDENTIFIER_GROUP | eflag, mask,
|
|
|
|
NFS4_ACL_WHO_GROUP, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (error < 0)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
pa++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (pa->e_tag == ACL_GROUP) {
|
|
|
|
mask = mask_from_posix(pa->e_perm, flags);
|
|
|
|
error = nfs4_acl_add_ace(acl, NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE,
|
|
|
|
NFS4_ACE_IDENTIFIER_GROUP | eflag, mask_mask,
|
|
|
|
NFS4_ACL_WHO_NAMED, pa->e_id);
|
|
|
|
if (error < 0)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error = nfs4_acl_add_ace(acl, NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE,
|
|
|
|
NFS4_ACE_IDENTIFIER_GROUP | eflag, mask,
|
|
|
|
NFS4_ACL_WHO_NAMED, pa->e_id);
|
|
|
|
if (error < 0)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
pa++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* deny ACEs */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pa = group_owner_entry;
|
|
|
|
mask = mask_from_posix(pa->e_perm, flags);
|
|
|
|
error = nfs4_acl_add_ace(acl, NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE,
|
|
|
|
NFS4_ACE_IDENTIFIER_GROUP | eflag,
|
|
|
|
deny_mask(mask, flags), NFS4_ACL_WHO_GROUP, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (error < 0)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
pa++;
|
|
|
|
while (pa->e_tag == ACL_GROUP) {
|
|
|
|
mask = mask_from_posix(pa->e_perm, flags);
|
|
|
|
error = nfs4_acl_add_ace(acl, NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE,
|
|
|
|
NFS4_ACE_IDENTIFIER_GROUP | eflag,
|
|
|
|
deny_mask(mask, flags), NFS4_ACL_WHO_NAMED, pa->e_id);
|
|
|
|
if (error < 0)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
pa++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (pa->e_tag == ACL_MASK)
|
|
|
|
pa++;
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(pa->e_tag != ACL_OTHER);
|
|
|
|
mask = mask_from_posix(pa->e_perm, flags);
|
|
|
|
error = nfs4_acl_add_pair(acl, eflag, mask, NFS4_ACL_WHO_EVERYONE, 0, flags);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
sort_pacl_range(struct posix_acl *pacl, int start, int end) {
|
|
|
|
int sorted = 0, i;
|
|
|
|
struct posix_acl_entry tmp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We just do a bubble sort; easy to do in place, and we're not
|
|
|
|
* expecting acl's to be long enough to justify anything more. */
|
|
|
|
while (!sorted) {
|
|
|
|
sorted = 1;
|
|
|
|
for (i = start; i < end; i++) {
|
|
|
|
if (pacl->a_entries[i].e_id
|
|
|
|
> pacl->a_entries[i+1].e_id) {
|
|
|
|
sorted = 0;
|
|
|
|
tmp = pacl->a_entries[i];
|
|
|
|
pacl->a_entries[i] = pacl->a_entries[i+1];
|
|
|
|
pacl->a_entries[i+1] = tmp;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
sort_pacl(struct posix_acl *pacl)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* posix_acl_valid requires that users and groups be in order
|
|
|
|
* by uid/gid. */
|
|
|
|
int i, j;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (pacl->a_count <= 4)
|
|
|
|
return; /* no users or groups */
|
|
|
|
i = 1;
|
|
|
|
while (pacl->a_entries[i].e_tag == ACL_USER)
|
|
|
|
i++;
|
|
|
|
sort_pacl_range(pacl, 1, i-1);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(pacl->a_entries[i].e_tag != ACL_GROUP_OBJ);
|
|
|
|
j = i++;
|
|
|
|
while (pacl->a_entries[j].e_tag == ACL_GROUP)
|
|
|
|
j++;
|
|
|
|
sort_pacl_range(pacl, i, j-1);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
nfs4_acl_nfsv4_to_posix(struct nfs4_acl *acl, struct posix_acl **pacl,
|
|
|
|
struct posix_acl **dpacl, unsigned int flags)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct nfs4_acl *dacl;
|
|
|
|
int error = -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*pacl = NULL;
|
|
|
|
*dpacl = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dacl = nfs4_acl_new();
|
|
|
|
if (dacl == NULL)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error = nfs4_acl_split(acl, dacl);
|
|
|
|
if (error < 0)
|
|
|
|
goto out_acl;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (pacl != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
if (acl->naces == 0) {
|
|
|
|
error = -ENODATA;
|
|
|
|
goto try_dpacl;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*pacl = _nfsv4_to_posix_one(acl, flags);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(*pacl)) {
|
|
|
|
error = PTR_ERR(*pacl);
|
|
|
|
*pacl = NULL;
|
|
|
|
goto out_acl;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
try_dpacl:
|
|
|
|
if (dpacl != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
if (dacl->naces == 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (pacl == NULL || *pacl == NULL)
|
|
|
|
error = -ENODATA;
|
|
|
|
goto out_acl;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error = 0;
|
|
|
|
*dpacl = _nfsv4_to_posix_one(dacl, flags);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(*dpacl)) {
|
|
|
|
error = PTR_ERR(*dpacl);
|
|
|
|
*dpacl = NULL;
|
|
|
|
goto out_acl;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
out_acl:
|
|
|
|
if (error && pacl) {
|
|
|
|
posix_acl_release(*pacl);
|
|
|
|
*pacl = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nfs4_acl_free(dacl);
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* While processing the NFSv4 ACE, this maintains bitmasks representing
|
|
|
|
* which permission bits have been allowed and which denied to a given
|
|
|
|
* entity: */
|
|
|
|
struct posix_ace_state {
|
|
|
|
u32 allow;
|
|
|
|
u32 deny;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct posix_user_ace_state {
|
|
|
|
uid_t uid;
|
|
|
|
struct posix_ace_state perms;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct posix_ace_state_array {
|
|
|
|
int n;
|
|
|
|
struct posix_user_ace_state aces[];
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* While processing the NFSv4 ACE, this maintains the partial permissions
|
|
|
|
* calculated so far: */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct posix_acl_state {
|
|
|
|
struct posix_ace_state owner;
|
|
|
|
struct posix_ace_state group;
|
|
|
|
struct posix_ace_state other;
|
|
|
|
struct posix_ace_state everyone;
|
|
|
|
struct posix_ace_state mask; /* Deny unused in this case */
|
|
|
|
struct posix_ace_state_array *users;
|
|
|
|
struct posix_ace_state_array *groups;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
static int
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
init_state(struct posix_acl_state *state, int cnt)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
int alloc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset(state, 0, sizeof(struct posix_acl_state));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* In the worst case, each individual acl could be for a distinct
|
|
|
|
* named user or group, but we don't no which, so we allocate
|
|
|
|
* enough space for either:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
alloc = sizeof(struct posix_ace_state_array)
|
|
|
|
+ cnt*sizeof(struct posix_ace_state);
|
|
|
|
state->users = kzalloc(alloc, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (!state->users)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
state->groups = kzalloc(alloc, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (!state->groups) {
|
|
|
|
kfree(state->users);
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
free_state(struct posix_acl_state *state) {
|
|
|
|
kfree(state->users);
|
|
|
|
kfree(state->groups);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
static inline void add_to_mask(struct posix_acl_state *state, struct posix_ace_state *astate)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
state->mask.allow |= astate->allow;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Certain bits (SYNCHRONIZE, DELETE, WRITE_OWNER, READ/WRITE_NAMED_ATTRS,
|
|
|
|
* READ_ATTRIBUTES, READ_ACL) are currently unenforceable and don't translate
|
|
|
|
* to traditional read/write/execute permissions.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* It's problematic to reject acls that use certain mode bits, because it
|
|
|
|
* places the burden on users to learn the rules about which bits one
|
|
|
|
* particular server sets, without giving the user a lot of help--we return an
|
|
|
|
* error that could mean any number of different things. To make matters
|
|
|
|
* worse, the problematic bits might be introduced by some application that's
|
|
|
|
* automatically mapping from some other acl model.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* So wherever possible we accept anything, possibly erring on the side of
|
|
|
|
* denying more permissions than necessary.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* However we do reject *explicit* DENY's of a few bits representing
|
|
|
|
* permissions we could never deny:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
static inline int check_deny(u32 mask, int isowner)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (mask & (NFS4_ACE_READ_ATTRIBUTES | NFS4_ACE_READ_ACL))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
if (!isowner)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (mask & (NFS4_ACE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES | NFS4_ACE_WRITE_ACL))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
static struct posix_acl *
|
|
|
|
posix_state_to_acl(struct posix_acl_state *state, unsigned int flags)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
struct posix_acl_entry *pace;
|
|
|
|
struct posix_acl *pacl;
|
|
|
|
int nace;
|
|
|
|
int i, error = 0;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
nace = 4 + state->users->n + state->groups->n;
|
|
|
|
pacl = posix_acl_alloc(nace, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (!pacl)
|
|
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
pace = pacl->a_entries;
|
|
|
|
pace->e_tag = ACL_USER_OBJ;
|
|
|
|
error = check_deny(state->owner.deny, 1);
|
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
goto out_err;
|
|
|
|
low_mode_from_nfs4(state->owner.allow, &pace->e_perm, flags);
|
|
|
|
pace->e_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i < state->users->n; i++) {
|
|
|
|
pace++;
|
|
|
|
pace->e_tag = ACL_USER;
|
|
|
|
error = check_deny(state->users->aces[i].perms.deny, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
goto out_err;
|
|
|
|
low_mode_from_nfs4(state->users->aces[i].perms.allow,
|
|
|
|
&pace->e_perm, flags);
|
|
|
|
pace->e_id = state->users->aces[i].uid;
|
|
|
|
add_to_mask(state, &state->users->aces[i].perms);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
pace++;
|
|
|
|
pace->e_tag = ACL_GROUP_OBJ;
|
|
|
|
error = check_deny(state->group.deny, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
goto out_err;
|
|
|
|
low_mode_from_nfs4(state->group.allow, &pace->e_perm, flags);
|
|
|
|
pace->e_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
|
|
|
|
add_to_mask(state, &state->group);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i < state->groups->n; i++) {
|
|
|
|
pace++;
|
|
|
|
pace->e_tag = ACL_GROUP;
|
|
|
|
error = check_deny(state->groups->aces[i].perms.deny, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
goto out_err;
|
|
|
|
low_mode_from_nfs4(state->groups->aces[i].perms.allow,
|
|
|
|
&pace->e_perm, flags);
|
|
|
|
pace->e_id = state->groups->aces[i].uid;
|
|
|
|
add_to_mask(state, &state->groups->aces[i].perms);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
pace++;
|
|
|
|
pace->e_tag = ACL_MASK;
|
|
|
|
low_mode_from_nfs4(state->mask.allow, &pace->e_perm, flags);
|
|
|
|
pace->e_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
pace++;
|
|
|
|
pace->e_tag = ACL_OTHER;
|
|
|
|
error = check_deny(state->other.deny, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
goto out_err;
|
|
|
|
low_mode_from_nfs4(state->other.allow, &pace->e_perm, flags);
|
|
|
|
pace->e_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
return pacl;
|
|
|
|
out_err:
|
|
|
|
posix_acl_release(pacl);
|
|
|
|
return ERR_PTR(error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
static inline void allow_bits(struct posix_ace_state *astate, u32 mask)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Allow all bits in the mask not already denied: */
|
|
|
|
astate->allow |= mask & ~astate->deny;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
static inline void deny_bits(struct posix_ace_state *astate, u32 mask)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Deny all bits in the mask not already allowed: */
|
|
|
|
astate->deny |= mask & ~astate->allow;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
static int find_uid(struct posix_acl_state *state, struct posix_ace_state_array *a, uid_t uid)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < a->n; i++)
|
|
|
|
if (a->aces[i].uid == uid)
|
|
|
|
return i;
|
|
|
|
/* Not found: */
|
|
|
|
a->n++;
|
|
|
|
a->aces[i].uid = uid;
|
|
|
|
a->aces[i].perms.allow = state->everyone.allow;
|
|
|
|
a->aces[i].perms.deny = state->everyone.deny;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
return i;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
static void deny_bits_array(struct posix_ace_state_array *a, u32 mask)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
int i;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
for (i=0; i < a->n; i++)
|
|
|
|
deny_bits(&a->aces[i].perms, mask);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
static void allow_bits_array(struct posix_ace_state_array *a, u32 mask)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
int i;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
for (i=0; i < a->n; i++)
|
|
|
|
allow_bits(&a->aces[i].perms, mask);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state,
|
|
|
|
struct nfs4_ace *ace)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
u32 mask = ace->access_mask;
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (ace2type(ace)) {
|
|
|
|
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
|
|
|
|
if (ace->type == NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE) {
|
|
|
|
allow_bits(&state->owner, mask);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
deny_bits(&state->owner, mask);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case ACL_USER:
|
|
|
|
i = find_uid(state, state->users, ace->who);
|
|
|
|
if (ace->type == NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE) {
|
|
|
|
allow_bits(&state->users->aces[i].perms, mask);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
deny_bits(&state->users->aces[i].perms, mask);
|
|
|
|
mask = state->users->aces[i].perms.deny;
|
|
|
|
deny_bits(&state->owner, mask);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
|
|
|
|
if (ace->type == NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE) {
|
|
|
|
allow_bits(&state->group, mask);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
deny_bits(&state->group, mask);
|
|
|
|
mask = state->group.deny;
|
|
|
|
deny_bits(&state->owner, mask);
|
|
|
|
deny_bits(&state->everyone, mask);
|
|
|
|
deny_bits_array(state->users, mask);
|
|
|
|
deny_bits_array(state->groups, mask);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case ACL_GROUP:
|
|
|
|
i = find_uid(state, state->groups, ace->who);
|
|
|
|
if (ace->type == NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE) {
|
|
|
|
allow_bits(&state->groups->aces[i].perms, mask);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
deny_bits(&state->groups->aces[i].perms, mask);
|
|
|
|
mask = state->groups->aces[i].perms.deny;
|
|
|
|
deny_bits(&state->owner, mask);
|
|
|
|
deny_bits(&state->group, mask);
|
|
|
|
deny_bits(&state->everyone, mask);
|
|
|
|
deny_bits_array(state->users, mask);
|
|
|
|
deny_bits_array(state->groups, mask);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case ACL_OTHER:
|
|
|
|
if (ace->type == NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE) {
|
|
|
|
allow_bits(&state->owner, mask);
|
|
|
|
allow_bits(&state->group, mask);
|
|
|
|
allow_bits(&state->other, mask);
|
|
|
|
allow_bits(&state->everyone, mask);
|
|
|
|
allow_bits_array(state->users, mask);
|
|
|
|
allow_bits_array(state->groups, mask);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
deny_bits(&state->owner, mask);
|
|
|
|
deny_bits(&state->group, mask);
|
|
|
|
deny_bits(&state->other, mask);
|
|
|
|
deny_bits(&state->everyone, mask);
|
|
|
|
deny_bits_array(state->users, mask);
|
|
|
|
deny_bits_array(state->groups, mask);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct posix_acl *
|
|
|
|
_nfsv4_to_posix_one(struct nfs4_acl *n4acl, unsigned int flags)
|
|
|
|
{
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
struct posix_acl_state state;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
struct posix_acl *pacl;
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
struct nfs4_ace *ace;
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
ret = init_state(&state, n4acl->naces);
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
|
|
return ERR_PTR(ret);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry(ace, &n4acl->ace_head, l_ace)
|
|
|
|
process_one_v4_ace(&state, ace);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
pacl = posix_state_to_acl(&state, flags);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
free_state(&state);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!IS_ERR(pacl))
|
|
|
|
sort_pacl(pacl);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
return pacl;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-24 13:04:03 +08:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
nfs4_acl_split(struct nfs4_acl *acl, struct nfs4_acl *dacl)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct list_head *h, *n;
|
|
|
|
struct nfs4_ace *ace;
|
|
|
|
int error = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
list_for_each_safe(h, n, &acl->ace_head) {
|
|
|
|
ace = list_entry(h, struct nfs4_ace, l_ace);
|
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] knfsd: nfsd4: acls: relax the nfsv4->posix mapping
Use a different nfsv4->(draft posix) acl mapping which is
1. completely backwards compatible,
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl, and
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions.
In detail:
1. completely backwards compatible: The new mapping produces the
same result on any acl produced by the existing (draft
posix)->nfsv4 mapping; the one exception is that we no longer
attempt to guess the value of the mask by assuming certain denies
represent the mask. Since the server still keeps track of the mask
locally, sequences of chmod's will still be handled fine; the only
thing this will change is sequences of chmod's with intervening
read-modify-writes of the acl. That last case just isn't worth the
trouble and the possible misrepresentations of the user's intent
(if we guess that a certain deny indicates masking is in effect
when it really isn't).
2. accepts any nfsv4 acl: That's not quite true: we still reject
acls that use combinations of inheritance flags that we don't
support. We also reject acls that attempt to explicitly deny
read_acl or read_attributes permissions, or that attempt to deny
write_acl or write_attributes permissions to the owner of the file.
3. errs on the side of restricting permissions: one exception to
this last rule: we totally ignore some bits (write_owner,
synchronize, read_named_attributes, etc.) that are completely alien
to our filesystem semantics, in some cases even if that would mean
ignoring an explicit deny that we have no intention of enforcing.
Excepting that, the posix acl produced should be the most
permissive acl that is not more permissive than the given nfsv4
acl.
And the new code's shorter, too. Neato.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 17:16:11 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ace->type != NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE &&
|
|
|
|
ace->type != NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((ace->flag & NFS4_INHERITANCE_FLAGS)
|
|
|
|
!= NFS4_INHERITANCE_FLAGS)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error = nfs4_acl_add_ace(dacl, ace->type, ace->flag,
|
2006-04-11 13:55:24 +08:00
|
|
|
ace->access_mask, ace->whotype, ace->who);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (error < 0)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
list_del(h);
|
|
|
|
kfree(ace);
|
|
|
|
acl->naces--;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static short
|
|
|
|
ace2type(struct nfs4_ace *ace)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
switch (ace->whotype) {
|
|
|
|
case NFS4_ACL_WHO_NAMED:
|
|
|
|
return (ace->flag & NFS4_ACE_IDENTIFIER_GROUP ?
|
|
|
|
ACL_GROUP : ACL_USER);
|
|
|
|
case NFS4_ACL_WHO_OWNER:
|
|
|
|
return ACL_USER_OBJ;
|
|
|
|
case NFS4_ACL_WHO_GROUP:
|
|
|
|
return ACL_GROUP_OBJ;
|
|
|
|
case NFS4_ACL_WHO_EVERYONE:
|
|
|
|
return ACL_OTHER;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BUG();
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(nfs4_acl_posix_to_nfsv4);
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(nfs4_acl_nfsv4_to_posix);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct nfs4_acl *
|
|
|
|
nfs4_acl_new(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct nfs4_acl *acl;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((acl = kmalloc(sizeof(*acl), GFP_KERNEL)) == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
acl->naces = 0;
|
|
|
|
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&acl->ace_head);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return acl;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
nfs4_acl_free(struct nfs4_acl *acl)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct list_head *h;
|
|
|
|
struct nfs4_ace *ace;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!acl)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (!list_empty(&acl->ace_head)) {
|
|
|
|
h = acl->ace_head.next;
|
|
|
|
list_del(h);
|
|
|
|
ace = list_entry(h, struct nfs4_ace, l_ace);
|
|
|
|
kfree(ace);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
kfree(acl);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
nfs4_acl_add_ace(struct nfs4_acl *acl, u32 type, u32 flag, u32 access_mask,
|
|
|
|
int whotype, uid_t who)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct nfs4_ace *ace;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((ace = kmalloc(sizeof(*ace), GFP_KERNEL)) == NULL)
|
2006-04-11 13:55:25 +08:00
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ace->type = type;
|
|
|
|
ace->flag = flag;
|
|
|
|
ace->access_mask = access_mask;
|
|
|
|
ace->whotype = whotype;
|
|
|
|
ace->who = who;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
list_add_tail(&ace->l_ace, &acl->ace_head);
|
|
|
|
acl->naces++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct {
|
|
|
|
char *string;
|
|
|
|
int stringlen;
|
|
|
|
int type;
|
|
|
|
} s2t_map[] = {
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.string = "OWNER@",
|
|
|
|
.stringlen = sizeof("OWNER@") - 1,
|
|
|
|
.type = NFS4_ACL_WHO_OWNER,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.string = "GROUP@",
|
|
|
|
.stringlen = sizeof("GROUP@") - 1,
|
|
|
|
.type = NFS4_ACL_WHO_GROUP,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.string = "EVERYONE@",
|
|
|
|
.stringlen = sizeof("EVERYONE@") - 1,
|
|
|
|
.type = NFS4_ACL_WHO_EVERYONE,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
nfs4_acl_get_whotype(char *p, u32 len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
2006-03-24 19:15:34 +08:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(s2t_map); i++) {
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (s2t_map[i].stringlen == len &&
|
|
|
|
0 == memcmp(s2t_map[i].string, p, len))
|
|
|
|
return s2t_map[i].type;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NFS4_ACL_WHO_NAMED;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
nfs4_acl_write_who(int who, char *p)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
2006-03-24 19:15:34 +08:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(s2t_map); i++) {
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (s2t_map[i].type == who) {
|
|
|
|
memcpy(p, s2t_map[i].string, s2t_map[i].stringlen);
|
|
|
|
return s2t_map[i].stringlen;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BUG();
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(nfs4_acl_new);
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(nfs4_acl_free);
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(nfs4_acl_add_ace);
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(nfs4_acl_get_whotype);
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(nfs4_acl_write_who);
|