luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
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ovl: check permission to open real file

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Call inode_permission() on real inode before opening regular file on one of
the underlying layers.

In some cases ovl_permission() already checks access to an underlying file,
but it misses the metacopy case, and possibly other ones as well.

Removing the redundant permission check from ovl_permission() should be
considered later.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
Miklos Szeredi 2020-06-02 22:20:26 +02:00
parent 292f902a40
commit 05acefb487
1 changed files with 14 additions and 2 deletions
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16
fs/overlayfs/file.c
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@ -40,10 +40,22 @@ static struct file *ovl_open_realfile(const struct file *file,
struct file *realfile;
const struct cred *old_cred;
int flags = file->f_flags | O_NOATIME | FMODE_NONOTIFY;
int acc_mode = ACC_MODE(flags);
int err;
if (flags & O_APPEND)
acc_mode |= MAY_APPEND;
old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb);
realfile = open_with_fake_path(&file->f_path, flags, realinode,
current_cred());
err = inode_permission(realinode, MAY_OPEN | acc_mode);
if (err) {
realfile = ERR_PTR(err);
} else if (!inode_owner_or_capable(realinode)) {
realfile = ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
} else {
realfile = open_with_fake_path(&file->f_path, flags, realinode,
current_cred());
}
revert_creds(old_cred);
pr_debug("open(%p[%pD2/%c], 0%o) -> (%p, 0%o)\n",