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proc: remove kernel.maps_protect

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After commit 831830b5a2 aka
"restrict reading from /proc/<pid>/maps to those who share ->mm or can ptrace"
sysctl stopped being relevant because commit moved security checks from ->show
time to ->start time (mm_for_maps()).

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
This commit is contained in:
Alexey Dobriyan 2008-10-10 03:27:16 +04:00
parent 45acb8db06
commit 3bbfe05967
6 changed files with 1 additions and 43 deletions
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7
Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
View File

@ -1332,13 +1332,6 @@ determine whether or not they are still functioning properly.
Because the NMI watchdog shares registers with oprofile, by disabling the NMI
watchdog, oprofile may have more registers to utilize.
maps_protect
------------
Enables/Disables the protection of the per-process proc entries "maps" and
"smaps". When enabled, the contents of these files are visible only to
readers that are allowed to ptrace() the given process.
msgmni
------

3
fs/proc/base.c
View File

@ -148,9 +148,6 @@ static unsigned int pid_entry_count_dirs(const struct pid_entry *entries,
return count;
}
int maps_protect;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(maps_protect);
static struct fs_struct *get_fs_struct(struct task_struct *task)
{
struct fs_struct *fs;

2
fs/proc/internal.h
View File

@ -45,8 +45,6 @@ do { \
extern int nommu_vma_show(struct seq_file *, struct vm_area_struct *);
#endif
extern int maps_protect;
extern int proc_tid_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task);
extern int proc_tgid_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,

16
fs/proc/task_mmu.c
View File

@ -210,9 +210,6 @@ static int show_map(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
dev_t dev = 0;
int len;
if (maps_protect && !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
return -EACCES;
if (file) {
struct inode *inode = vma->vm_file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
@ -742,22 +739,11 @@ const struct file_operations proc_pagemap_operations = {
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
extern int show_numa_map(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
static int show_numa_map_checked(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
struct proc_maps_private *priv = m->private;
struct task_struct *task = priv->task;
if (maps_protect && !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
return -EACCES;
return show_numa_map(m, v);
}
static const struct seq_operations proc_pid_numa_maps_op = {
.start = m_start,
.next = m_next,
.stop = m_stop,
.show = show_numa_map_checked
.show = show_numa_map,
};
static int numa_maps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)

5
fs/proc/task_nommu.c
View File

@ -110,11 +110,6 @@ int task_statm(struct mm_struct *mm, int *shared, int *text,
static int show_map(struct seq_file *m, void *_vml)
{
struct vm_list_struct *vml = _vml;
struct proc_maps_private *priv = m->private;
struct task_struct *task = priv->task;
if (maps_protect && !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
return -EACCES;
return nommu_vma_show(m, vml->vma);
}

11
kernel/sysctl.c
View File

@ -80,7 +80,6 @@ extern int pid_max_min, pid_max_max;
extern int sysctl_drop_caches;
extern int percpu_pagelist_fraction;
extern int compat_log;
extern int maps_protect;
extern int latencytop_enabled;
extern int sysctl_nr_open_min, sysctl_nr_open_max;
#ifdef CONFIG_RCU_TORTURE_TEST
@ -809,16 +808,6 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
},
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
{
.ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED,
.procname = "maps_protect",
.data = &maps_protect,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
},
#endif
{
.ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED,