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d_path: Use struct path in struct avc_audit_data

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audit_log_d_path() is a d_path() wrapper that is used by the audit code.  To
use a struct path in audit_log_d_path() I need to embed it into struct
avc_audit_data.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Jan Blunck 2008-02-14 19:38:33 -08:00 committed by Linus Torvalds
parent a03a8a709a
commit 44707fdf59
6 changed files with 43 additions and 51 deletions
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5
include/linux/audit.h
View File

@ -534,8 +534,7 @@ extern void audit_log_n_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab,
const char *string);
extern void audit_log_d_path(struct audit_buffer *ab,
const char *prefix,
struct dentry *dentry,
struct vfsmount *vfsmnt);
struct path *path);
extern void audit_log_lost(const char *message);
/* Private API (for audit.c only) */
extern int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type);
@ -552,7 +551,7 @@ extern int audit_enabled;
#define audit_log_hex(a,b,l) do { ; } while (0)
#define audit_log_untrustedstring(a,s) do { ; } while (0)
#define audit_log_n_untrustedstring(a,n,s) do { ; } while (0)
#define audit_log_d_path(b,p,d,v) do { ; } while (0)
#define audit_log_d_path(b, p, d) do { ; } while (0)
#define audit_enabled 0
#endif
#endif

12
kernel/audit.c
View File

@ -1312,26 +1312,26 @@ void audit_log_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string)
/* This is a helper-function to print the escaped d_path */
void audit_log_d_path(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *prefix,
struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *vfsmnt)
struct path *path)
{
char *p, *path;
char *p, *pathname;
if (prefix)
audit_log_format(ab, " %s", prefix);
/* We will allow 11 spaces for ' (deleted)' to be appended */
path = kmalloc(PATH_MAX+11, ab->gfp_mask);
if (!path) {
pathname = kmalloc(PATH_MAX+11, ab->gfp_mask);
if (!pathname) {
audit_log_format(ab, "<no memory>");
return;
}
p = d_path(dentry, vfsmnt, path, PATH_MAX+11);
p = d_path(path->dentry, path->mnt, pathname, PATH_MAX+11);
if (IS_ERR(p)) { /* Should never happen since we send PATH_MAX */
/* FIXME: can we save some information here? */
audit_log_format(ab, "<too long>");
} else
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, p);
kfree(path);
kfree(pathname);
}
/**

28
kernel/auditsc.c
View File

@ -208,8 +208,7 @@ struct audit_context {
int name_count;
struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */
struct dentry * pwd;
struct vfsmount * pwdmnt;
struct path pwd;
struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
struct audit_aux_data *aux;
struct audit_aux_data *aux_pids;
@ -786,12 +785,9 @@ static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
__putname(context->names[i].name);
}
context->name_count = 0;
if (context->pwd)
dput(context->pwd);
if (context->pwdmnt)
mntput(context->pwdmnt);
context->pwd = NULL;
context->pwdmnt = NULL;
path_put(&context->pwd);
context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
}
static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
@ -930,8 +926,7 @@ static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk
if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
vma->vm_file) {
audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
vma->vm_file->f_path.dentry,
vma->vm_file->f_path.mnt);
&vma->vm_file->f_path);
break;
}
vma = vma->vm_next;
@ -1341,10 +1336,10 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
call_panic = 1;
if (context->pwd && context->pwdmnt) {
if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
if (ab) {
audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", context->pwd, context->pwdmnt);
audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd);
audit_log_end(ab);
}
}
@ -1367,8 +1362,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
case 0:
/* name was specified as a relative path and the
* directory component is the cwd */
audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", context->pwd,
context->pwdmnt);
audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
break;
default:
/* log the name's directory component */
@ -1695,10 +1689,10 @@ void __audit_getname(const char *name)
context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
context->names[context->name_count].osid = 0;
++context->name_count;
if (!context->pwd) {
if (!context->pwd.dentry) {
read_lock(&current->fs->lock);
context->pwd = dget(current->fs->pwd.dentry);
context->pwdmnt = mntget(current->fs->pwd.mnt);
context->pwd = current->fs->pwd;
path_get(&current->fs->pwd);
read_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
}

15
security/selinux/avc.c
View File

@ -568,10 +568,11 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
audit_log_format(ab, " capability=%d", a->u.cap);
break;
case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_FS:
if (a->u.fs.dentry) {
struct dentry *dentry = a->u.fs.dentry;
if (a->u.fs.mnt) {
audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", dentry, a->u.fs.mnt);
if (a->u.fs.path.dentry) {
struct dentry *dentry = a->u.fs.path.dentry;
if (a->u.fs.path.mnt) {
audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=",
&a->u.fs.path);
} else {
audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, dentry->d_name.name);
@ -626,8 +627,12 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
case AF_UNIX:
u = unix_sk(sk);
if (u->dentry) {
struct path path = {
.dentry = u->dentry,
.mnt = u->mnt
};
audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=",
u->dentry, u->mnt);
&path);
break;
}
if (!u->addr)

28
security/selinux/hooks.c
View File

@ -1356,8 +1356,8 @@ static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt;
ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
}
@ -1375,15 +1375,12 @@ static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_path.mnt;
struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
int rc;
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt;
ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
@ -1418,7 +1415,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
@ -1476,7 +1473,7 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
av = DIR__SEARCH;
av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
@ -1523,7 +1520,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
ad.u.fs.dentry = old_dentry;
ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
if (rc)
@ -1539,7 +1536,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
return rc;
}
ad.u.fs.dentry = new_dentry;
ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
if (new_dentry->d_inode)
av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
@ -1918,8 +1915,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
}
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
ad.u.fs.mnt = bprm->file->f_path.mnt;
ad.u.fs.dentry = bprm->file->f_path.dentry;
ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
newsid = tsec->sid;
@ -2315,7 +2311,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
return rc;
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
}
@ -2324,7 +2320,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
struct avc_audit_data ad;
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
}
@ -2587,7 +2583,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value
return -EPERM;
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);

6
security/selinux/include/avc.h
View File

@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/in6.h>
#include <linux/path.h>
#include <asm/system.h>
#include "flask.h"
#include "av_permissions.h"
@ -30,8 +31,6 @@ extern int selinux_enforcing;
struct avc_entry;
struct task_struct;
struct vfsmount;
struct dentry;
struct inode;
struct sock;
struct sk_buff;
@ -46,8 +45,7 @@ struct avc_audit_data {
struct task_struct *tsk;
union {
struct {
struct vfsmount *mnt;
struct dentry *dentry;
struct path path;
struct inode *inode;
} fs;
struct {