nfsd: nfsd should drop CAP_MKNOD for non-root
Since creating a device node is normally an operation requiring special privilege, Igor Zhbanov points out that it is surprising (to say the least) that a client can, for example, create a device node on a filesystem exported with root_squash. So, make sure CAP_MKNOD is among the capabilities dropped when an nfsd thread handles a request from a non-root user. Reported-by: Igor Zhbanov <izh1979@gmail.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
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@ -393,7 +393,9 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
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# define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, ~0 }})
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# define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP), ~0 }})
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# define CAP_FS_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0, CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
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# define CAP_NFSD_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0|CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE), \
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# define CAP_NFSD_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
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| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) \
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| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MKNOD), \
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CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
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#endif /* _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */
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