jffs2: validate symlink size in jffs2_do_read_inode_internal()

`csize' is read from disk and thus needs validation.  Otherwise a bogus
value 0xffffffff would turn the subsequent kmalloc(csize + 1, ...) into
kmalloc(0, ...), leading to out-of-bounds write.

This patch limits `csize' to JFFS2_MAX_NAME_LEN, which is also used
in jffs2_symlink().

Artem: we actually validate csize by checking CRC, so this 0xFFs cannot
come from empty flash region. But I guess an attacker could feed JFFS2
an image with random csize value, including 0xFFs.

Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Artem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
This commit is contained in:
Xi Wang 2012-04-25 14:45:22 -04:00 committed by David Woodhouse
parent 8abc0d4a11
commit 7c80c35233

View File

@ -1266,6 +1266,12 @@ static int jffs2_do_read_inode_internal(struct jffs2_sb_info *c,
/* Symlink's inode data is the target path. Read it and
* keep in RAM to facilitate quick follow symlink
* operation. */
uint32_t csize = je32_to_cpu(latest_node->csize);
if (csize > JFFS2_MAX_NAME_LEN) {
mutex_unlock(&f->sem);
jffs2_do_clear_inode(c, f);
return -ENAMETOOLONG;
}
f->target = kmalloc(je32_to_cpu(latest_node->csize) + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!f->target) {
JFFS2_ERROR("can't allocate %d bytes of memory for the symlink target path cache\n", je32_to_cpu(latest_node->csize));