jffs2: validate symlink size in jffs2_do_read_inode_internal()
`csize' is read from disk and thus needs validation. Otherwise a bogus value 0xffffffff would turn the subsequent kmalloc(csize + 1, ...) into kmalloc(0, ...), leading to out-of-bounds write. This patch limits `csize' to JFFS2_MAX_NAME_LEN, which is also used in jffs2_symlink(). Artem: we actually validate csize by checking CRC, so this 0xFFs cannot come from empty flash region. But I guess an attacker could feed JFFS2 an image with random csize value, including 0xFFs. Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Artem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
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@ -1266,6 +1266,12 @@ static int jffs2_do_read_inode_internal(struct jffs2_sb_info *c,
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/* Symlink's inode data is the target path. Read it and
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* keep in RAM to facilitate quick follow symlink
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* operation. */
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uint32_t csize = je32_to_cpu(latest_node->csize);
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if (csize > JFFS2_MAX_NAME_LEN) {
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mutex_unlock(&f->sem);
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jffs2_do_clear_inode(c, f);
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return -ENAMETOOLONG;
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}
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f->target = kmalloc(je32_to_cpu(latest_node->csize) + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!f->target) {
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JFFS2_ERROR("can't allocate %d bytes of memory for the symlink target path cache\n", je32_to_cpu(latest_node->csize));
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