file capabilities: don't prevent signaling setuid root programs
An unprivileged process must be able to kill a setuid root program started by the same user. This is legacy behavior needed for instance for xinit to kill X when the window manager exits. When an unprivileged user runs a setuid root program in !SECURE_NOROOT mode, fP, fI, and fE are set full on, so pP' and pE' are full on. Then cap_task_kill() prevents the user from signaling the setuid root task. This is a change in behavior compared to when !CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES. This patch introduces a special check into cap_task_kill() just to check whether a non-root user is signaling a setuid root program started by the same user. If so, then signal is allowed. Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
parent
d0eec99ce5
commit
8ec2328f11
@ -526,6 +526,15 @@ int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
|
||||
if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Running a setuid root program raises your capabilities.
|
||||
* Killing your own setuid root processes was previously
|
||||
* allowed.
|
||||
* We must preserve legacy signal behavior in this case.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (p->euid == 0 && p->uid == current->uid)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/* sigcont is permitted within same session */
|
||||
if (sig == SIGCONT && (task_session_nr(current) == task_session_nr(p)))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user