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rpmsg: validate incoming message length before propagating

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When an inbound message arrives, validate its reported length before
propagating it, otherwise buggy (or malicious) remote processors might
trick us into accessing memory which we really shouldn't.

Signed-off-by: Ohad Ben-Cohen <ohad@wizery.com>
Cc: Grant Likely <grant.likely@secretlab.ca>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Mark Grosen <mgrosen@ti.com>
Cc: Suman Anna <s-anna@ti.com>
Cc: Fernando Guzman Lugo <fernando.lugo@ti.com>
Cc: Rob Clark <rob@ti.com>
Cc: Ludovic BARRE <ludovic.barre@stericsson.com>
Cc: Loic PALLARDY <loic.pallardy@stericsson.com>
Cc: Omar Ramirez Luna <omar.luna@linaro.org>
This commit is contained in:
Ohad Ben-Cohen 2012-02-28 16:16:48 +02:00
parent fa2d7795b2
commit 9648224e56
1 changed files with 10 additions and 0 deletions
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10
drivers/rpmsg/virtio_rpmsg_bus.c
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@ -778,6 +778,16 @@ static void rpmsg_recv_done(struct virtqueue *rvq)
print_hex_dump(KERN_DEBUG, "rpmsg_virtio RX: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, print_hex_dump(KERN_DEBUG, "rpmsg_virtio RX: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1,
msg, sizeof(*msg) + msg->len, true); msg, sizeof(*msg) + msg->len, true);
/*
* We currently use fixed-sized buffers, so trivially sanitize
* the reported payload length.
*/
if (len > RPMSG_BUF_SIZE ||
msg->len > (len - sizeof(struct rpmsg_hdr))) {
dev_warn(dev, "inbound msg too big: (%d, %d)\n", len, msg->len);
return;
}
/* use the dst addr to fetch the callback of the appropriate user */ /* use the dst addr to fetch the callback of the appropriate user */
mutex_lock(&vrp->endpoints_lock); mutex_lock(&vrp->endpoints_lock);
ept = idr_find(&vrp->endpoints, msg->dst); ept = idr_find(&vrp->endpoints, msg->dst);