random: make consistent usage of crng_ready()
commit a96cfe2d427064325ecbf56df8816c6b871ec285 upstream. Rather than sometimes checking `crng_init < 2`, we should always use the crng_ready() macro, so that should we change anything later, it's consistent. Additionally, that macro already has a likely() around it, which means we don't need to open code our own likely() and unlikely() annotations. Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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@ -125,18 +125,13 @@ static void try_to_generate_entropy(void);
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*/
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int wait_for_random_bytes(void)
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{
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if (likely(crng_ready()))
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return 0;
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do {
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while (!crng_ready()) {
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int ret;
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ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready(), HZ);
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if (ret)
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return ret > 0 ? 0 : ret;
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try_to_generate_entropy();
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} while (!crng_ready());
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}
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return 0;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes);
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@ -293,7 +288,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(void)
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++next_gen;
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WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.generation, next_gen);
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WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.birth, jiffies);
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if (crng_init < 2) {
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if (!crng_ready()) {
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crng_init = 2;
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finalize_init = true;
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}
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@ -361,7 +356,7 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS],
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* ready, we do fast key erasure with the base_crng directly, because
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* this is what crng_pre_init_inject() mutates during early init.
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*/
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if (unlikely(!crng_ready())) {
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if (!crng_ready()) {
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bool ready;
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spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
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@ -804,7 +799,7 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(size_t nbits)
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entropy_count = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add);
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} while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig);
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if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_count >= POOL_MIN_BITS)
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if (!crng_ready() && entropy_count >= POOL_MIN_BITS)
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crng_reseed();
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}
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@ -961,7 +956,7 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void)
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extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
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++base_crng.generation;
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if (arch_init && trust_cpu && crng_init < 2) {
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if (arch_init && trust_cpu && !crng_ready()) {
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crng_init = 2;
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pr_notice("crng init done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n");
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}
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@ -1550,7 +1545,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
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case RNDRESEEDCRNG:
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if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
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return -EPERM;
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if (crng_init < 2)
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if (!crng_ready())
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return -ENODATA;
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crng_reseed();
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return 0;
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