luck/tmp_suning_uos_patched
1
0
Fork 1
Code Issues Pull Requests Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

capabilities: move audit log decision to function

Browse Source 
Move the audit log decision logic to its own function to isolate the
complexity in one place.

Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
This commit is contained in:
Richard Guy Briggs 2017-10-11 20:57:10 -04:00 committed by James Morris
parent 81a6a01299
commit 9fbc2c7964
1 changed files with 30 additions and 20 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

50
security/commoncap.c
View File

@ -765,6 +765,32 @@ static inline bool __is_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
static inline bool __is_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{ return !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid); }
/*
* Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set
*
* We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true:
* 1) cap_effective has all caps
* 2) we are root
* 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT)
* Since this is just a normal root execing a process.
*
* Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think
* that is interesting information to audit.
*/
static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *cred, kuid_t root)
{
bool ret = false;
if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, cred)) {
if (!__cap_full(effective, cred) ||
!__is_eff(root, cred) || !__is_real(root, cred) ||
!root_privileged()) {
ret = true;
}
}
return ret;
}
/**
* cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve().
* @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds
@ -841,26 +867,10 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new)))
return -EPERM;
/*
* Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set
*
* We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true:
* 1) cap_effective has all caps
* 2) we are root
* 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT)
* Since this is just a normal root execing a process.
*
* Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think
* that is interesting information to audit.
*/
if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, new)) {
if (!__cap_full(effective, new) ||
!__is_eff(root_uid, new) || !__is_real(root_uid, new) ||
!root_privileged()) {
ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
if (nonroot_raised_pE(new, root_uid)) {
ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);