crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - restore signature length check
commit d3481accd974541e6a5d6a1fb588924a3519c36e upstream. RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures are required to be the same length as the RSA key size. RFC8017 specifically requires the verifier to check this (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8017#section-8.2.2). Commita49de377e0
("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad") changed the kernel to allow longer signatures, but didn't explain this part of the change; it seems to be unrelated to the rest of the commit. Revert this change, since it doesn't appear to be correct. We can be pretty sure that no one is relying on overly-long signatures (which would have to be front-padded with zeroes) being supported, given that they would have been broken since commitc7381b0128
("crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms"). Fixes:a49de377e0
("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.6+ Cc: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@linaro.org> Suggested-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify(struct akcipher_request *req)
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if (WARN_ON(req->dst) ||
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WARN_ON(!req->dst_len) ||
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!ctx->key_size || req->src_len < ctx->key_size)
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!ctx->key_size || req->src_len != ctx->key_size)
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return -EINVAL;
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req_ctx->out_buf = kmalloc(ctx->key_size + req->dst_len, GFP_KERNEL);
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