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SELinux: remove unused av.decided field

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It appears there was an intention to have the security server only decide
certain permissions and leave other for later as some sort of a portential
performance win.  We are currently always deciding all 32 bits of
permissions and this is a useless couple of branches and wasted space.
This patch completely drops the av.decided concept.

This in a 17% reduction in the time spent in avc_has_perm_noaudit
based on oprofile sampling of a tbench benchmark.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This commit is contained in:
Eric Paris 2009-02-12 14:50:54 -05:00 committed by James Morris
parent 21193dcd1f
commit f1c6381a6e
4 changed files with 6 additions and 14 deletions
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15
security/selinux/avc.c
View File

@ -381,30 +381,25 @@ static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
* @ssid: source security identifier
* @tsid: target security identifier
* @tclass: target security class
* @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass
*
* Look up an AVC entry that is valid for the
* @requested permissions between the SID pair
* (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions
* based on @tclass. If a valid AVC entry exists,
* then this function return the avc_node.
* Otherwise, this function returns NULL.
*/
static struct avc_node *avc_lookup(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested)
static struct avc_node *avc_lookup(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
{
struct avc_node *node;
avc_cache_stats_incr(lookups);
node = avc_search_node(ssid, tsid, tclass);
if (node && ((node->ae.avd.decided & requested) == requested)) {
if (node)
avc_cache_stats_incr(hits);
goto out;
}
else
avc_cache_stats_incr(misses);
node = NULL;
avc_cache_stats_incr(misses);
out:
return node;
}
@ -875,7 +870,7 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
rcu_read_lock();
node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested);
node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass);
if (!node) {
rcu_read_unlock();

1
security/selinux/include/security.h
View File

@ -88,7 +88,6 @@ int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap);
#define SEL_VEC_MAX 32
struct av_decision {
u32 allowed;
u32 decided;
u32 auditallow;
u32 auditdeny;
u32 seqno;

2
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
View File

@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
length = scnprintf(buf, SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT,
"%x %x %x %x %u",
avd.allowed, avd.decided,
avd.allowed, 0xffffffff,
avd.auditallow, avd.auditdeny,
avd.seqno);
out2:

2
security/selinux/ss/services.c
View File

@ -407,7 +407,6 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
* Initialize the access vectors to the default values.
*/
avd->allowed = 0;
avd->decided = 0xffffffff;
avd->auditallow = 0;
avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
avd->seqno = latest_granting;
@ -743,7 +742,6 @@ int security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
if (!ss_initialized) {
avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
avd->decided = 0xffffffff;
avd->auditallow = 0;
avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
avd->seqno = latest_granting;