tmp_suning_uos_patched/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
Stephen Smalley c7c556f1e8 selinux: refactor changing booleans
Refactor the logic for changing SELinux policy booleans in a similar
manner to the refactoring of policy load, thereby reducing the
size of the critical section when the policy write-lock is held
and making it easier to convert the policy rwlock to RCU in the
future.  Instead of directly modifying the policydb in place, modify
a copy and then swap it into place through a single pointer update.
Only fully copy the portions of the policydb that are affected by
boolean changes to avoid the full cost of a deep policydb copy.
Introduce another level of indirection for the sidtab since changing
booleans does not require updating the sidtab, unlike policy load.
While we are here, create a common helper for notifying
other kernel components and userspace of a policy change and call it
from both security_set_bools() and selinux_policy_commit().

Based on an old (2004) patch by Kaigai Kohei [1] to convert the policy
rwlock to RCU that was deferred at the time since it did not
significantly improve performance and introduced complexity. Peter
Enderborg later submitted a patch series to convert to RCU [2] that
would have made changing booleans a much more expensive operation
by requiring a full policydb_write();policydb_read(); sequence to
deep copy the entire policydb and also had concerns regarding
atomic allocations.

This change is now simplified by the earlier work to encapsulate
policy state in the selinux_policy struct and to refactor
policy load.  After this change, the last major obstacle to
converting the policy rwlock to RCU is likely the sidtab live
convert support.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/6e2f9128-e191-ebb3-0e87-74bfccb0767f@tycho.nsa.gov/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20180530141104.28569-1-peter.enderborg@sony.com/

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-08-17 21:00:33 -04:00

184 lines
3.9 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Implementation of the hash table type.
*
* Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include "hashtab.h"
static struct kmem_cache *hashtab_node_cachep;
/*
* Here we simply round the number of elements up to the nearest power of two.
* I tried also other options like rouding down or rounding to the closest
* power of two (up or down based on which is closer), but I was unable to
* find any significant difference in lookup/insert performance that would
* justify switching to a different (less intuitive) formula. It could be that
* a different formula is actually more optimal, but any future changes here
* should be supported with performance/memory usage data.
*
* The total memory used by the htable arrays (only) with Fedora policy loaded
* is approximately 163 KB at the time of writing.
*/
static u32 hashtab_compute_size(u32 nel)
{
return nel == 0 ? 0 : roundup_pow_of_two(nel);
}
int hashtab_init(struct hashtab *h, u32 nel_hint)
{
h->size = hashtab_compute_size(nel_hint);
h->nel = 0;
if (!h->size)
return 0;
h->htable = kcalloc(h->size, sizeof(*h->htable), GFP_KERNEL);
return h->htable ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
}
int __hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_node **dst,
void *key, void *datum)
{
struct hashtab_node *newnode;
newnode = kmem_cache_zalloc(hashtab_node_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!newnode)
return -ENOMEM;
newnode->key = key;
newnode->datum = datum;
newnode->next = *dst;
*dst = newnode;
h->nel++;
return 0;
}
void hashtab_destroy(struct hashtab *h)
{
u32 i;
struct hashtab_node *cur, *temp;
for (i = 0; i < h->size; i++) {
cur = h->htable[i];
while (cur) {
temp = cur;
cur = cur->next;
kmem_cache_free(hashtab_node_cachep, temp);
}
h->htable[i] = NULL;
}
kfree(h->htable);
h->htable = NULL;
}
int hashtab_map(struct hashtab *h,
int (*apply)(void *k, void *d, void *args),
void *args)
{
u32 i;
int ret;
struct hashtab_node *cur;
for (i = 0; i < h->size; i++) {
cur = h->htable[i];
while (cur) {
ret = apply(cur->key, cur->datum, args);
if (ret)
return ret;
cur = cur->next;
}
}
return 0;
}
void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info)
{
u32 i, chain_len, slots_used, max_chain_len;
struct hashtab_node *cur;
slots_used = 0;
max_chain_len = 0;
for (i = 0; i < h->size; i++) {
cur = h->htable[i];
if (cur) {
slots_used++;
chain_len = 0;
while (cur) {
chain_len++;
cur = cur->next;
}
if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
max_chain_len = chain_len;
}
}
info->slots_used = slots_used;
info->max_chain_len = max_chain_len;
}
int hashtab_duplicate(struct hashtab *new, struct hashtab *orig,
int (*copy)(struct hashtab_node *new,
struct hashtab_node *orig, void *args),
int (*destroy)(void *k, void *d, void *args),
void *args)
{
struct hashtab_node *cur, *tmp, *tail;
int i, rc;
memset(new, 0, sizeof(*new));
new->htable = kcalloc(orig->size, sizeof(*new->htable), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new->htable)
return -ENOMEM;
new->size = orig->size;
for (i = 0; i < orig->size; i++) {
tail = NULL;
for (cur = orig->htable[i]; cur; cur = cur->next) {
tmp = kmem_cache_zalloc(hashtab_node_cachep,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tmp)
goto error;
rc = copy(tmp, cur, args);
if (rc) {
kmem_cache_free(hashtab_node_cachep, tmp);
goto error;
}
tmp->next = NULL;
if (!tail)
new->htable[i] = tmp;
else
tail->next = tmp;
tail = tmp;
new->nel++;
}
}
return 0;
error:
for (i = 0; i < new->size; i++) {
for (cur = new->htable[i]; cur; cur = tmp) {
tmp = cur->next;
destroy(cur->key, cur->datum, args);
kmem_cache_free(hashtab_node_cachep, cur);
}
}
kmem_cache_free(hashtab_node_cachep, new);
return -ENOMEM;
}
void __init hashtab_cache_init(void)
{
hashtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("hashtab_node",
sizeof(struct hashtab_node),
0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
}